Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

In the Matter of the George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter
Vivos Revocable Trust, Kim Fisher and Michael
Fisher v. Brent Fisher : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Charles M. Bennett; Blackburn & Stoll; Attorneys for Petitioners.
Christopher S. Hill; Kirton & McConkie; Attorneys for Respondent .
Christopher S. Hill #9931 KIRTON & McCONKIE PO Box 45120 Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
801 328-3600 Counsel for the Appellee
Charles M. Bennett #283 BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 257 West 200 South, Suite 800 Salt Lake
City, UT 84101 801 521-7900 Counsel for the Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Fisher v. Fisher, No. 20080389 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/883

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF THE GEORGE
FISHER, JR. FAMILY INTER VIVOS
REVOCABLE TRUST,
An Irrevocable Trust.

Appellate Case No. 20080389-CA
Trial Court Case No. 043800019
Judge A. Lynn Payne

KIM FISHER AND MICHAEL
FISHER,
Appellants,
17C

VS.

BRENT FISHER,
Appellee.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Christopher S. Hill #9931
KIRTON & McCONKIE
PO Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
801 328-3600

Charles M. Bennett #283
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
257 West 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
801 521-7900

Counsel for the Appellee

Counsel for the Appellants

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 1 7 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE MATTER OF THE GEORGE
FISHER, JR. FAMILY INTER VIVOS
REVOCABLE TRUST,
An Irrevocable Trust.

Appellate Case No. 20080389-CA
Trial Court Case No. 043800019
Judge A. Lynn Payne

KIM FISHER AND MICHAEL
FISHER,
Appellants,

BRENT FISHER,
1
Appellee.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Christopher S. Hill #9931
KIRTON & McCONKIE
PO Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
801 328-3600

Charles M. Bennett #283
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
257 West 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
801 521-7900

Counsel for the Appellee

Counsel for the Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 1

Description

i1

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii 1

| TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1 ISSUES FOR REVIEW

11
11

1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ETC.

3|

1 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

3

| STATEMENT OF THE CASE

10 1
14 1
15 1

1 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
| ARGUMENT
1.
1

I

The Trial Court Erred When it Held that Brent Converted 50
Head of Cattle on May 8,1995 Valued at $550 per Head.

15

a.

The Trial Court Misinterpreted the May 8,1995 Allocation
and Erred as a Matter of Law in Setting the Conversion Date
as May 8, 1995.

15

b.

The Trial Court Erred By Ruling on Matters Contrary to the
Parties' Claims When it Implicitly Found that Brent's
Agreement with George Continued after George's Date of

18

1

1

Death.
c.

The Trial Court's Finding that Brent Converted 50 Head of
Cattle is Clearly Erroneous.

20

d.

The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in
Valuing the Converted Cattle at $550 per head.

24

2.

The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law When it Gave Brent a
Credit for Property Taxes and Water Assessments He Paid While
Converting the Use of the Fisher Trust's Land.

25

3.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Award
Attorney Fees Against Brent Fisher Personally.

27

i

Description

Page

a.

The Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Crucial
Role the Prohibition Against Self-dealing Plays
as a Deterrent to the Trustee's Use of the Trust
for His Personal Benefit.

27

b.

The Trial Court Erred by Improperly Excusing
Brent's Failure to Produce Documentary
Evidence He Was Ordered to Produce.

32

c.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Not Awarding
Attorney Fees Against Brent Personally.

36

1 CONCLUSION

40 J

1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

42J
ADDENDUM

TAB 1

DESCRIPTION
Judgment, filed April 10, 2006

11

Ruling, filed July 13,2006

2

Ruling, filed October 2, 2006

31

Ruling, filed May 1, 2005

4|

Ruling and Order, filed November 16, 2007

51

Trial Exhibit 15, "Trustees Allocation of the Properties Held Under the George
Fisher, Jr. Family Revocable Trust Dated October 10, 1975"

6

Trial Exhibit 17, February 22, 1997 Updated Appraisal Letter

7

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Citation

Page
Cases

\A K & R Whipple Plumbing and Heating v Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94
P.3d270
Broadwater v Old Republic Sur, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993)
Callister v Callister, 15 Utah 2d 380, 393 P.2d 477 (Utah 1964)
Christensen & Jensen, P C v Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, 194
P.3d93l
Combe v Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc , 680 P.2d 733 (Utah
1984)
Fibro Trust, Inc v Brahman Fin, Inc , 1999 UT 13, 974 P.2d 288
Hughes v Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, 89 P.3d 148
| J Pochynok Co, Inc v Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, 116 P.3d 353
Lake v Hermes Associates, 552 P.2d 126 (Utah 1976)

37, 39

24 I
31 1
2
18, 19
1,2
2, 36, 37, 40

38 1
1

Meinhardv Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)

30

Mountain States Broadcasting Co v Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah
App. 1989

38

| State v Levine, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096
| State v Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

2,3,36
36

| Walker v Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253 (Utah 1965)
| Wheeler ex rel Wheeler v Mann, 763 P.2d 758 (Utah 1988)

HI

26, 27, 32, 34
27,31,37

Citation

Page
Statutes

36 1

Utah Code Ann. §75-7-1004
Utah Code Ann. §75-7-1103(3)

11
11

1 Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(j)
1 Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
J Utah R. Civ. P. 34

34 J
Miscellaneous

George Gleason Bogert, George Taylor Bogert, Amy Morris Hess,
Bogert's Trusts And Trustees, § 543, "Trustee's Duty of Loyalty to
the Beneficiaries," (Current through 2008 update)

27

Jesse Dukeminier, Stanley M. Johanson, James Lindgren, and
Robert H. Sitkoff, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, Aspen Publishers, 7th

29

1 Ed. 2005
Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: an Examination of Fiduciary
Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 719, Fall 1994
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,
J 105 Yale L.J. 625(1995)
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §205, comment i (1959)
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 83. Duty To Keep Records And
Provide Reports (Current through August 2008)

IV

29

28, 29
26
26, 27

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Eighth Judicial District Court for
Duchesne County, The Supreme Court had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-3-102(3)(j). Based on the Supreme Court's Order dated June 4, 2008, the Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Issue for Review: Regarding the cattle that trustee, Brent Fisher ("Brent"),
converted, did the trial court correctly determine the date of the conversion, the number of
cattle converted, and the value of the cattle converted? Preserved at H.19-28;1 R.379-80.
Standard of Review: "Whether the trial court properly applied the law of
conversion is a legal question, which we review for correctness." Fibro Trust, Inc. v.
Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, ^ 19, 974 P.2d 288. Because the trial court's findings
concerning the date of conversion, the cattle converted, and their value are ultimately
based on the proper interpretation of written documents, the standard of review is
correction of error. Lake v. Hermes Associates, 552 P.2d 126, 128 (Utah 1976).
Issue for Review: Regarding the calculation of damages for the trustee's selfdealing in using the Trust's ranch and farm land, did the trial court improperly give the
trustee credit for the payment of property taxes and water assessments? Preserved at
R.381-87;H.18, 29-33.

1

"H." refers to the transcript of the April 25, 2006 hearing at R.904.
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Standard of Review: " Whether the trial court properly applied the law of
conversion is a legal question, which we review for correctness." Fibro Trust, Inc. v.
Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, % 19, 974 P.2d 288. Whether a party paid a particular
expense and in what amount would normally be treated as a question of fact, reversible
only for "clear error." Christensen & Jensen, B.C. v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, ^[20,
194 P.3d 931. However, where the party claiming the expense is a trustee who was
ordered to produce all documents supporting the claimed expense, the issue is a mixed
question of fact and law. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals
should give less deference to the trial court's ruling than it might otherwise give. State v.
Levine, 2006 UT 50, ^[25, 144 P.3d 1096.
Issue for Review: Did the trial court correctly refuse to award attorney fees and
expenses against Brent Fisher personally and in favor of Michael and Kim Fisher?
Preserved at R.387; H.34-35.
Standard of Review: Because the Fishers' claim for payment of their attorney
fees and expenses is based on the inherent power of the trial court to award attorney fees
and expenses in trust litigation, the trial court's decision is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard. Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ^]20, 89 P.3d 148. Because the trial
court failed to consider the trustee's culpability and the policy behind Utah's absolute
prohibition of self-dealing, the Court of Appeals should give less deference to the trial
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court's rulings than it might otherwise give. State v. Levine, 2006 UT 50, ^[25, 144 P.3d
1096.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ETC.
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of or of central importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While serving as Trustee of the George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos Revocable
Trust (the "Fisher Trust") between April 18, 1992 and May 26, 2001, Brent Fisher
converted valuable trust assets to his own use and benefit. R.534-539. On December 27,
2003, Michael Fisher and Kim Fisher (the "Fishers") and their sister, Susan Thacker, filed
a petition to recover all trust assets that Brent had taken or lost. R. 1-42. When Susan
withdrew her support for the petition (R.69), the Fishers, appellants herein, continued the
lawsuit against Brent.
On February 23, 2004, Brent delivered to the Fishers a document Brent claimed
was "an accounting for the trust covering the period from 1992 to 2000." R.215, ^[4. This
"accounting" was admitted into evidence as trial exhibit 1}

2

For ease of reference, trial exhibit 1 is referred to as the "Accounting" or
"Brent's Accounting." It has no beginning inventory, no ending inventory, nor any
reconciliation establishing that the assets on hand equal the ending inventory. Further, it
is titled a "Cash Flow Analysis." As noted, Brent identified it as an accounting. R.213221; 222-232; see R.215, fl.
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Thereafter, the Fishers filed their "Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; in the
Alternative, Motion for Order Compelling Brent Fisher to Verify His Answers Regarding
Required Accountings." R.128-132.3 They sought a judgment that Brent had failed to
account, reserving the amount of damages. Id. Anticipating that Brent in response would
assert he had accounted and had provided supporting documentation, they asked the trial
court in the alternative to order Brent to respond under oath that he had provided all of the
required supporting documents. R.130.4
Prior to the scheduled hearing on the Fishers' Motion, Brent and the Fishers
stipulated and the trial court ordered:
2.
[T]he Court orders Brent Fisher to produce to Kim and
Michael Fisher all of the underlying documents and records that show the
beginning inventory of assets when he began his administration of the
[Fisher] Trust, that show all receipts during his administration of the Trust,
that show all disbursements during the administration of the Trust, that
show all sales during his administration of the Trust, and that show the
assets of the Trust remaining on hand at the end of the accounting period.
For purposes of this Order, the Court sets the accounting period as
beginning on April 18, 1992 and ending on May 26, 2001.
3.
The Court orders Brent Fisher to file a formal response .. .
aver[ring] he has produced all documents that the Court has ordered him to
produce and the date of that production.

3

The Clerk numbered record pages 128 through 132 twice (as 128, 129, 130, 131,
132, 128, 129, 130, 131, and 132). This reference is to the pages first numbered 128-132.
4

See preceding footnote re numbering of pages 128-132.
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R. 269-73. In response to the Order, Brent delivered 1,575 pages of documents to the
Fishers. R.301, «p, R.302,1J10. On August 5, 2005, Brent filed a "Notice of Production
of Documents Pursuant to Court Order" (R.276-78) in which his counsel averred:
To the extent the documents identified in the order exist and are in the
possession of [Brent Fisher], they will have been produced on August 11,
2005. In the event additional documents related to [Brent Fisher's]
administration during the accounting period are discovered hereafter, then
[sic] responses shall be supplemented.
R.277, ^[5.* There was no supplementation until after the close of evidence at the end of
the trial. R.391-93.
Because the documents Brent produced contained only a handful of documents
related to the Fisher Trust and the vast majority were Brent Fisher's personal financial
records (see testimony of David Castleton at T.80-91), the Fishers then filed a motion for
a contempt citation. R.277-80.6 As part of that motion, the Fishers alleged that the Trial
court order required Brent to aver personally and under oath, and he had not done so.
R.285.
The trial court denied the Fishers' motion and held that the response by Brent's
attorney constituted Brent's averment. R.325-26. It further stated its view that the
Fishers should have filed a motion to compel and suggested the parties move as quickly

5

In preparing the record for appeal, the clerk of the court inadvertently numbered
two pages 277 and two pages 278 in this order, 277, 278, 277, 278. This reference is to
the first page 277.
6

Beginning on the second page 277. See preceding footnote.
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as possible so the trial court could order an evidentiary hearing. Id. Thereafter, the
Fishers filed their Rule 16 motion for a scheduling conference, and that led to the one day
evidentiary hearing on March 16, 2006. R. 350-51, 367, T. at 393.
Following the close of evidence, the trial court ordered the Fishers to prepare a
calculation of damages and file it with the trial court. T.310-11. The trial court
scheduled closing arguments to be held on April 25, 2006. R.494-95.
The Fishers filed their damage calculation on April 4, 2006. R.379-89. On April
20, 2006, Brent Fisher moved to reopen the evidence in order to submit documentary
evidence regarding a claim that he had taken or lost $170,556 in sales proceeds shown on
his Accounting. R. 391-92; see T.Exh 1, at 2. That matter was briefed, and following
closing arguments, the trial court granted that motion at the hearing held on April 26,
2008. H.lOl. Thereafter, the parties agreed to submit affidavits and have the trial court
rule on the case with the additional evidence contained in the affidavits. R.506-07.
The trial court entered its ''Ruling" on July 13, 2006. Regarding Brent's
conversion of the Trust's cattle, the trial court ruled:
4.
On May 8, 1995 LaRue Fisher and Brent Fisher allocated the
properties held by the original trust. The real property (200 acres of farm
land and one- half interest in 320 acres of ranch land) was divided equally
between the Marital and Family Trusts. Fifty head of cattle was divided,
with 30 head (60%) going to the Family Trust and 20 heard [sic] (40%)
going to the Marital Trust.
5.
Prior to the 1995 allocation, the Trust assets had been appraised (in
late 1992 or early 1993). This appraisal listed, as a [sic] Trust assets, 50
head of cattle with a value of $42,000.00. In 1997 a second appraisal was
Page 6

completed which iisKil 100 head ot cattle having a value of $55,000.Oo,
Brent Fisher was aware of each appraisal and made no objection to the
inclusion of cattle in either appraisal. Brent Fisher was serving as Trustee at
the time each appraisal was prepared and should have contested the
inclusion of cattle which did not exist.
'
^n February 20, 2004 (which was after this action was filed) Brent
Fisher and LaRue Fisher acting as Trustees of the original Trust amended
(he 1995 allocation. The amendment purportedly corrected the 1995
allocations statement that there were fifty head of cows and stated that when
- > ii?c Fisher died, the trust owned no cows.
"lie Court accepts the testimonv that the arrangement between
fiant fisher and his father was that he keep the calf crop as partial
compensation for his efforts and labor in running the farming operaiu i
Nevertheless, based on the original allocations, which was signed b\ Bieui
i;isher and which attested to the ownership of 50 head of cows, the Court
nh<i> ih.K ihe trust owned 50 head of cows on Ma> S. h-'WS ('ertainh Brem
fisher. v\ho was then operating the farm, knew or should have known. \iw
number ol cows 1 lis statement attesting to the existence of 50 head is
strung and convincing evidence. Value is another issue. The Court has noi
received any evidence as to the \alue of the cattle other than the 1992-1993
and. 1(H>7 appraisals. The Courts |sic] specific finding is that 50 cows were
owned by the 1 rust m Ma\ 1995. The agreement between Brent and his
father (George Jr) pre dated the ! rust. Based upon this, the Court believes
that main, il no! a: >r die cows remaining in the I rust in 1995 were older
cows I he second appraisal properly reduces the values of older cows.
« M ier LOWS have a shorter remaining life expectancy and therefore less
value as producing livestock. While the Court does not give weight to the
l c ) 7 7 appraisal as to the number of cattle, there is no reason to doubt the
accuracx of the valuations. Valuation of cattle is readily available through
existing markets. The 1997 valuation of older cattle was $550. oo tor cattle
sex en to eight \ears old. Based upon the e\ idence before the Court, ilu
Court will value ihe 50 head at $550.00 a head, or $27,500.00. In doing so
the Court must express some frustration with the fact that there was no
direct evidence as to valuation in 1995, I lowever, based upon the evidence
before the Court. I am conHortablc that this is the most accurate figure
available to the Court.
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8.
These cattle are no longer held by the Trust and there has been no
explanation as to their disposition or accounting for proceeds received. The
agreement between Mr. Brent Fisher and his father (George) was that the
Trust would receive the proceeds as the Trust cows were culled from the
herd.7 The Court will therefore find that Mr. Brent Fisher appropriated the
sum of $27,500.00 from the Trust and that judgement should enter in favor
of the family trust for $16,5000.00 (60%) and $11,000.00 (40%) for the
Marital trust.
R. 534-36.
Regarding Brent's conversion of the Trust's lands, it set the damages for Brent's
use of the ranch and farm land and gave Brent credit for property taxes and water
assessments he paid. R.536-39, ^ 9 - 1 4 . It denied the claim for recovery of $170,566.00.
R.539-40, T|15. It further denied the Fishers' claim against Brent personally that he pay
all of the attorney fees incurred by the Fishers. R.590, ^J17.
Thereafter, the Fishers filed a motion in the nature of a Rule 59 motion claiming
the trial court erred: (I) in deciding not to award attorney fees against Brent on a
"prevailing party" theory rather than a consideration of the trustee's culpability in
converting assets; and (ii) in determining the cattle conversion occurred on May 8, 1995
(rather than George's date of death), using a valuation from 1997, and in using 50 head of
cattle rather than 100 head of cattle. R. 543-545. They argued that the trial court failed to
consider that Brent was the trustee, it was his duty to account, and he had been ordered to
produce all documents in support of his accounting. R.554-55. The trial court denied that

7

Culling cows is a livestock management technique in which older cattle are sold
to insure the health of the herd. See T. 180:23-181:4.
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motion in its "Ruling" entered on October 2, 21)06 R 600- 02. J \.s to tl te cattle
O H I \ CI SN 111 I l k

ll l.ll i,

l i l l I l l l i il

There wn.s no direct evidence as to when conversion occurred. However, the
Court believed the testimony of Brent Fisher that he and his father agreed
that Brent Fisher would keep the calves and George Fisher would receive
the proceeds from the sale of older cattle as they were culled from the herd
e w as no evidence as to when each individual animal was sold.
c\a\ it is obvious that this did not occurred at one time, but was
.^melhing that took place over several years. Nor was there am evidence as
to the value of older cattle at inarkel. I he Court used the values an*"
numbers of cattle that it felt was most c<>n\ mcing based upon a review of
the e\ idence
:> it ic1' r ir ask eel to i i: lal x a fit idii ig tl lat Bt ei it Fisl ler
\ ioiak d Ills duties as a trustees [sic] to keep records, and did not do so.'*1 R.600-601.
Thereafter, the Fishers prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law and a
judgment
F

hiv.i/i whjL^icu ^ d.-.;^ p ^ d d n g
•

ugh -UJ>4. On Ma\ i, 2 u 0 / , the trial court entered its

"Ruling" on the proposed findings, conclusions, and. judgment. It resolved a number of
disputes. In one regard, it reversed lis i n k I T 20l><» Ruling h\ hokliii.j lli il i
: u mi-!-

' catlie because the date of

conversion had not been proven to the trial couri. R " U-?h Since this issue had not
been briefed by the parties, the trial court granted ihc \ >hcr^ the ngiu ... ,.u

-i ,.. .HHI

to tl lis rulii ig R 726.
The Fishers then filed their objection. 729-732. Brent responded. 733-40 < h\
November 16, 2007, the trial conn issued its decision reinstating its ruling granting
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prejudgment interest on the cattle from May 8, 1995 forward. R.748-51. It also directed
counsel for the Fishers to prepare a judgment consistent with the trial court's Rulings of
July 13, 2006, October 2, 2006, May 1, 2007, and November 16, 2007 and ruled that
those rulings together would constitute the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law. Id.
The Fishers thereafter prepared a single set of findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but the trial court refused to enter those pleadings. R.793-94. On April 10, 2008, the
trial court entered its judgment. R.787-92. The Fishers filed their appeal on May 6, 2008.
R.795-96. Brent filed a cross appeal on May 20, 2006. R.802-804.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
George Fisher, Jr. ("George") died on April 18, 1992. R.534. He was survived by
his wife, LaRue Fisher ("LaRue"), and five children, Brent Fisher ("Brent"), Michael
Fisher ("Michael"), Kim Fisher ("Kim"), Susan Thatcher ("Susan"), and Max Fisher.
R. 1-42. Max Fisher is not a party to these proceedings.
On October 10, 1975, LaRue and George as settlors executed the Fisher Trust.
T.Exh. 18.8 They were its initial trustees. Original Trust; Article VIII A. at 9. Upon
George's death, LaRue, Max Fisher, and Brent were nominated as successor co-trustees.

8

The last four pages of trial exhibit 18 is the First Amendment to Revocable Trust
dated December 7, 1978 (hereafter the "Amended Trust").
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However, LaRue "shall not act as Co-trustee of the Family Trust and tm M a n u l » • - '"

Upon George's death, the Fisher 1 rust directed its trustees to divide the trust into
two new trusts: a Marital Trust and a Family T n ist Sn • T F \ h . 18, Amended Trust,
Article 111 A. al I

llu-M.uil.il I id ,1 ,iiul Ihe I amiF I U * MI-, i n n m able in I1, ll I

1: lelcl a percentage oft! le assets thai
XIII A. at 14

; ;

UCOPJLC

owned at death. Id Original Trust, Article

(both trusts irrevocable); Amended TmsL Aniele III B. al 2-"

(percentage division between Mai iuil ami I aniii) \ msi.w. Amenaeu ;: u -a. . \ i ! . , •.
a

irital' I it i ist); \i i lei nk >

•

=M

-

lifetime beneficiary of the Marital and l a n i i h lruot.s. U

.

'

-K^e v\a:> Uie

i u children o f F a R u e a n d

George were the remainder beneficiaries of the Mnriiai 1 n> a nul poiuni.ii iikiime
beiieliciaines ul tin lamiiK 11 UMI

"'i' " < h ipiii,

beneficiaries); Amended Trust, Article 111 F. €,,1 ui j- ^potential lifetime beneficiaries).
In establishing the Fisher Trust. 1 aRue and George identified several pieces of real
property as being owne*. . , i..^ , .....

:.i . .pie a\

fi iti ii e pei soi lal pi op si t; j located thereon.'" Id., Schedule A (following ixme 18 ol ilk,
Original Trust): see also Original I UKL Article X IV ai 1"
now owned ,:m:

.ill real ami personal property

.. hYdiK real ami personal properties acLjaacd .

be par t o f tl le Fisl ici f it i ist).

y

"*' f ' """" stai i :1s f en ll in : tit ial ti ai isci ij >l (<: i in id at R 903.
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,

»

At George's death, the Fisher Trust owned certain farm and ranch land comprising
approximately 480 acres. T.Exh. 17. It also owned mineral rights, a bank account, and a
tractor. T.Exh. 15 at 4,1fij2-3. The parties dispute whether the Fisher Trust owned cattle
at George's date of death. As noted above, the trial court held the Fisher Trust owned 50
head of cattle on May 8, 1995, and it held Brent converted the cattle. R.535-36, ffl[8-9.
The trial court found that Brent and George had an "arrangement" that permitted
Brent to use the farm and ranch land in return for Brent's management of the farm and
ranch. R.535-36, ^[7. There was no testimony that the oral "arrangement" survived
George's date of death or that it was binding on the Fisher Trust.
Following his father's death, Brent sought and obtained LaRue's permission to
continue to manage the ranch and farm. T.266. He also asked the trust's lawyer about
whether to sell or run the ranch and farm. T.266-67; see also H.49:17-50:13 (closing
argument by Brent's counsel). Prior to George's death, Brent sold the cull cows and gave
the proceeds to his father. T.180. After his father's death, he kept those proceeds.
T.Exh. 1 (Brent's accounting reported no income to the Fisher Trust related to cattle).
On May 8, 1995, LaRue and Brent as co-Trustees of the Fisher Trust executed the
"Trustees Allocation of the Properties Held Under the George Fisher, Jr. Family
Revocable Trust Dated October 10, 1975" (the "May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation"). T.Exh.
15 at 1. The allocation stated it was being made "pursuant to Article III" of the Fisher
Trust. Article III A. stated:

Page 12

At the death of first oi iiiv |>.ctlk>is| to die, liic irustees snan ui\iue me
Trust Fstate into two separate trusts, hereinafter designated iv *u-> M*^'* t\
TnM :M"1 Family TruM rvsn^rin .-h
T.Exh. 18, Amended Irusl, Article 111 A. -:, \

\ hu > me allocation identified each

properh owned by the Fisher Trust, its date of death value, and how it \\CIN tx-mg
al r..!i-..-(i i v h u e i l lilt: M i i i l || ami 1 .Jllllb I I'lNv

\ m n i > iilliri

.ISM'!1-

MH

li'lni jlmm

identified: "50 head of mixed breed beef cows valued at $42,0000 at date of death of
decedent/* T.Fxh. 15 at 4.
•:. , ebruary
Desi^h.-iii.

,;•,,..

..». I .mil l« im \ > 1i uh J .i

j .i:\ii. 21. 1 he) named each of themselves as a co-trustee of

the Fisher I'ruM < >n Ma\ 26, 2001, Brent MichaeF Kim, and Susan agreed on a division
of the real property o\v!Ku i * IMV. i i ,.u • i \\A a i - . - i u ^ j ;

;. au.i;-

r

: y..

.

Michael, kmu and Susan liled the petition tor reeo\er\ of assets that had been lost **r
taken. R .1-42.
Ihi.icaJlu uii I I'bui.iii \ '0

JO I hn in ami I .ih'ih. i (M ruled ;i iluuimuil

Mini il

"First Amendment to trustee's Allocation of the Properties Held Under the George
Fisher, Jr.. Fan lily Revocable Trust dated October 10, 1075." T.Exh. 16. In relevant part,
il s i a k d ;

ias ttow come u> the collective attention of said Co-trustees that the
innial Allocation incorrectly reflected the I'ruM as owning fift) (50) head of
mixed breed beef cows on the date of death of George Fisher Jr. when in
fact the Trust owned no such cows;
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Id. at 1 (emphasis added). The amendment then purported to delete the cattle from the
May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation. Id. at 2.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court misread the May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation and the February 22,
1997 updated appraisals. As a result, it valued the wrong number of cattle on the wrong
date. The correct interpretation of the May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation and the February 22,
1997 updated appraisals establish that Trustee Brent Fisher converted 100 head of cattle
on April 18, 1992 valued at $840.00 per head.
The trial court erred when it granted Trustee Brent Fisher a credit for property
taxes and water assessments he paid. Having converted the Fisher Trust's land, Brent
Fisher was not entitled to a credit for payments that benefit his personal use of the
converted property.
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused to award attorney fees and
expenses in favor of the Fishers and against Trustee Brent Fisher personally. The trial
court should have ordered the trustee to personally pay the Fishers' fees in order to make
the Fisher Trust whole and to do justice and equity in this matter.
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ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court Erred When it Held that Brei.
Cattle on May 8, 1995 Valued at $550 per Head.
a.

The Trial ('ourt Misinterpreted the May 8, 1995 Allocation and. Erred
as a Matter of Law in *" I i (ting the Conversion Date as May 8, 1005.

I IK: Iria! uniil < nit ml
The Court a^cept^ ihc leslimon\ thai the arrangement between Brent fisher
and his father was thai he keep the calf crop as partial compensation lor hi:
efforts and Lihor in running the farming operation. S'cwrdie/ess bused on
the original allocations, which was signed by Brent fisher and which
attested to the ownership o\ 50 head of cows, the Court finds that the trust
owned 50 head of cows on May 8, 1995. Certainly Brent Fisher, who was
then operating the farm, knew or should have known, the number of cows.
His statement attesting to the existence of 50 head is strong and com inung
e\ ideik,.
he (1ouris [sic] specific finding is tluit ?0 cows were owned
hy die Trust in May !<J(J5
R.53'%. ,enipnaMh atkh .
agree" Jem i'

^

-;

that Max X, 19 95 was the date of conversion was "based on die

original allocations." A Thus, the date of comersion depends upon (he terms of IlkMay 8, 1995 Inis! Mlocalioii. A cjicliii iwuimL *.; n,, nu i „ia^au^, ;>••.
allocal ioi i was effective as of George's date of deatl i, "'" pi ill 18, 1992, and that it was
allocating assets the trust owned on that date.
The Fisher Trust directed the division of

UK.

1

IMIU

i i\M as loiiuws-

.v ii^ain in die in si %>1 tlic [George and LaKucj lo die. me i ruslccs shall
.... idc ihc 1 rust Instate into two separate trusts, hereinafter designated as the
Marital Trust and the Family Trust, respectively.
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T. Exh. 18, Amended Trust at 1, Article III, TfA. The May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation
fulfills the direction in the Fisher Trust to divide the assets between the Marital and
Family Trust. Thus, the May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation states:
Pursuant to the death of GEORGE FISHER, JR. on April 18, 1992, LaRUE
FISHER and BRENT ELMER FISHER, as Trustees of the abovementioned Trust, do hereby allocate the properties of said Trust between the
Family Trust Portion and the Marital Trust Portion pursuant to Article III of
said Trust as follows:
T. Exh. 15 at 1 (emphasis added). The May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation then identifies four
separate categories of property to be divided between the Marital Trust and the Family
Trust. Id. at 1-5, ^1-4. In addition to providing a description of each property listed, the
allocation further states the date of death value of each listed property. Id. at 1-4. With
regard to cattle, the allocation states: "50 head of mixed breed beef cows valued at
$42,000 at date of death of decedent." Id at 4.
The allocation carefully identifies the "date of death" value for each item because
"Pursuant to the death of GEORGE FISHER, JR. on April 18, 1992" and "per the terms
of Article III" the Fisher Trust directed the Trustees to "divide" the Fisher Trust "at the
date of death of [George Fisher]." T.Exh. 15 at 1; T.Exh. 18, Amended Trust at 1. Thus,
the May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation supports only one conclusion: On April 18, 1992, the
Fisher Trust held "50 head of mixed breed beef cows valued at $42,000."10 The May 8,

10

As discussed in subparagraph I.e. below, there were actually 100 head of cattle
at the time of George's death.
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1995 Trust Allocation allocated cows that were in existence on George > dale <.i J,.iii. .is
i eqi ill ed b> Ai dele III : >f tl i z Fisl lei I i i ist.
The "First Amendment to 1rustec"s Allocation of the Properties Held Under the
George Fisher, Jr. Family Revocable Trust dated October 10, 1975" confirms this
anai\ M : .. I . j \

. . <

misrepresentation of the number of cattle in the first allocation (Compare

T. 159:2-23 with

I lh5:2-5k staled in relevant part:
fl]t has now come to the collective auention ot said Co-trustees that the
Initial Allocation incorrecth reflected the Trust as owning fifty (50) head of
mixed breed beef cows on //>*• tUne nt'thutih of'Ceorge Fisher Jr
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
Finally, there is no financial evidence of am ki.ui l o w i n g thai Brent treated Hie
Fisl ler I rust as ow i lii ig ai iy cattl i at

.

s

-

'

'

] v

I

• :'

Accounting shows 110 incoine from cattle to the Fisher Iru^t). Instead, Brent treated all of
the farm expenses on a separate ledger as having been paid by Brent personally. See
I .Exl i It at 3. I ie i lever accoi n ited foi ai ty it icon i.e 1 ic i xc h /ed f it: • : I it i ai p ' • : >f tl le cattle alk i
< * i*!v\ .!o.i"i. id at 1-2.
V, IIK- trial coi irt n iledi "These cattle are no lot iger held by the Trust and there has
been no explanation as to then unou-anon or account. ; i
H!'1

Hi." 1-nil

l l f . r N J i n Imsi

I,IIJ

f

.»-.^ v i

111- - M,n X I'M* 11 ust Allocation establish that - i 50

head of mixed breed beef cows" were owned by the l-idiei I nisi on April 18, 1992.
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There being "no explanation as to their disposition or accounting for proceeds received,"
that was the date of the conversion.
b.

The Trial Court Erred By Ruling on Matters Contrary to the Parties'
Claims When it Implicitly Found that Brent's Agreement with George
Continued after George's Date of Death.

The trial court ruled:
The Courts [sic] specific finding is that 50 cows were owned by the Trust in
May 1995. The agreement between Brent and his father (George Jr) pre
dated the Trust. Based upon this, the Court believes that many, if not all, of
the cows remaining in the Trust in 1995 were older cows.
R.536, f7. Since the trial court determined that the converted cows were "older" "in
1995," it impliedly found that Brent's agreement with George continued beyond George's
death. If the agreement terminated at George's death, their age in 1995 would be
irrelevant. This implicit finding constitutes a finding rendered outside the issues
presented to the trial court and is thus a reversible error of law. Combe v. Warren's
Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984).
In closing argument, the Fishers' counsel argued:
Well, the issue, though, is what was the value at the date of death? That's
when the conversion takes place because the estate has a value at that point,
and the way we got there was we used the hundred head of cattle, that is
identified here [in trial exhibit 17], but not this appraisal because this is an
updated appraisal. We used the value that was established back in 1992, and
that came from the [May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation].
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H.20:20-21:3. While the Fishers did not acknowledge the verity of the alleged
"arrangement" between Brent and his father, they nonetheless implicitly argued it
terminated at George's death.
On the other hand, Brent's counsel admitted the agreement terminated on George's
death.
That arrangement [between Brent and George] was proper. In 1980, in
1981, in '82, '83, every year until George passed. And George passes in
1992, and Brent talks with his mom . . . He involves his attorney, Paul
Barton, and says, "What am I to do now?" And the decision [was] made, in
consultation with these people is: Keep doing what you've always done.
H.49:21-50:6 (emphasis added); see also T.266:7-267:11 (Brent's testimony supporting
counsel's statement). Brent's acknowledgment that the agreement terminated on
George's death was binding on Brent and the trial court.
It is error to adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and
unsupported by the record. The trial court is not privileged to determine
matters outside the issues of the case, and if [it] does, [its] findings will
have no force or effect. In law or in equity, a judgment must be responsive
to the issues framed by the pleadings, and a trial court has no authority to
render a decision on issues not presented for determination. Any findings
rendered outside the issues are a nullity.
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984) (citations
omitted).
Thus, the trial court's implicit finding that Brent's agreement with his father
continued beyond his father's date of death rendered outside the issues presented to it was
a legal nullity.
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c.

The Trial Court's Finding that Brent Converted 50 Head of Cattle is
Clearly Erroneous.

The trial court held that Brent converted 50 head of cattle based on the May 8,
1995 Trust Allocation. R. 535-36,1fl[7-8. It found that Brent would have known how
many head of cattle he owned on that date and his statement in the May 8, 1995 Trust
Allocation was "strong and convincing evidence" of the number of cattle held by the
Fisher Trust on May 8, 1995. R. 535, %7. As illustrated above, the trial court's findings
on these points are incorrect based on its misreading of the May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation.
There is no evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's finding, because
Brent testified that he intentionally misrepresented the number of cattle the Fisher Trust
owned in the May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation. T.159- 161, 166, 210-11. He testified that
the Fisher Trust owned no cattle at his father's date of death. T. 158-59; 210; 281. He
even went so far as to execute a written disclaimer on February 20, 2004, purporting to
modify the May 8, 1995 Trust Allocation. T. Exh. 16. Brent's counsel confirmed this
intentional misrepresentation in closing arguments. H. 65:22-66:16. As to why he
misrepresented the number of cattle, Brent gave differing reasons. T. 159:10-14 (dispute
with siblings); T. 160:24-161:8 (not sure what date he documented Fisher Trust's cattle
was gone); T. 161:9-14 ("never sold none of the cows" so "the cows would still be
there"); T.208:8-17 (thought there might have been cows there but made a mistake);
209:22-210:1 (when siblings made claims against him, he "got turned around"); T.210:25 (finally: "I don't know").
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On the other hand, there was untainted evidence of the number of head of cattle
that the Fisher Trust owned on the date George died. On February 22, 1997, Darren
Anderson, on behalf of Cloward's Appraisal Service, wrote Brent a letter opining as to
the then current value for each item of property owned by the Fisher Trust at George's
date of death and originally appraised on November 12, 1992. T. Exh. 17. The letter was
addressed to Brent Fisher. In relevant part it stated:
Re: George Fisher Jr. Family Trust Consisting of Four Separate Parcels
Land w/ Water Rights .. . Fisher Livestock- 100 Bred Beef Cows
Dear Brent:
According to your request, I have herein completed updated values on the
above described properties belonging to the George Fisher Jr. Family Trust.
For further detailed descriptions of these properties, please refer to the
original appraisal that were completed on November 12, 1992 on these
parcels as well as on the livestock. In fact, the updated values contained
herein are invalid unless this letter is accompanied by the November 12,
1992, appraisals.
Concerning the value(s) of the livestock consisting of some 100 mixed breed, bred
cows ranging in age from five to ten years, I am of the opinion that the five to
seven year old cows would be worth somewhere in the range of $650.00. The
seven to eight year old cows $550.00, and the nine to ten year old cows $450.00,
with a running average for the herd as a whole of $550 per head.
T. Exh. 17 at 1, 2.
The trial court rejected the letter's identification of 100 head of cattle being owned
by the Fisher Trust at George's date of death. It reasoned:
Based upon the evidence the Court has no confidence that the 1997
appraisal accurately reported the existence of 100 cows in the Trust. There
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is no evidence that the appraiser, who lived in Colorado, ever came to Utah
and observed or counted cows. Indeed the evidence is that he did not.
R.535, f7.
This finding is clearly erroneous. Again, there is no evidence to marshal in
support of this finding. Rather, it is expressly contradicted by Brent Fisher's testimony.
No, I've never talked to Darin [sic] Anderson until — I've never talked to
him. Except when the first time when he made the very first appraisal when
he come up, but after the second one, I never had no contact.
T. 129:8-12; see also T. 123:11-16 (Anderson did not come back to appraise the ground
the second time "like he did the first time"); T. 124:14-16 ("he made the first appraisal
here"). Mr. Anderson "came up" and met with Brent to work on the first appraisal prior
to November 12, 1992. Thus, Mr. Anderson was present and could count the cows before
the initial appraisal was completed.
Moreover, even if the trial court's finding were in fact correct, its conclusion that
the report was unreliable is illogical. The identification of the property could have been
based on information supplied by Brent Fisher or someone else. The issue is whether the
first appraisal and the second appraisal correctly identified the number of cattle owned by
the Fisher Trust on George's date of death. The letter itself states:
For further detailed descriptions of these properties, please refer to the
original appraisal that were completed on November 12, 1992 on these
parcels as well as on the livestock. In fact, the updated values contained
herein are invalid unless this letter is accompanied by the November 12,
1992, appraisals.
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T.Exh. 17 at 1. This establishes that the properties listed in the February 22, 1997 letter
were identical to those listed in the first appraisal, when Mr. Anderson "came up" to the
property.
Furthermore, other evidence established that the February 22, 1997 accurately
identified the number of head of cattle originally appraised and that were subject to the
updated reappraisal. Kim Fisher testified that the Fisher family held a meeting in the
office of the trust lawyer (Mr. Barton) in October 1997. T.219:15-220:3. Mr. Barton,
LaRue, and her four children, Brent, Michael, Kim and Susan, were all present. T.220:615. Everyone at the meeting was given a copy of the letter. T.221:2-9. The parties used
the letter to discuss how to divide the trust properties. T.220:19-22; 221:10-12. Kim
testified that Brent never objected to the letter's representation that there were 100 head
of cattle at George's date of death. T.221:13-24. Id. As the trial court found: "Brent
Fisher was serving as Trustee at the time each appraisal was prepared and should have
contested the inclusion of cattle which did not exist/' R.535, ^[5.
The original appraisal appraised 100 head of mixed breed, bred cows as of
George's date of death. Thus, the second appraisal also appraised 100 head of mixed
breed, bred cows as of February 22, 1997. Kim's testimony established that Brent, his
mother, his siblings, and Mr. Barton used and relied on the February 22, 1997 letter
without any objection by Brent. The trial court recognized that Brent should have
objected if the number of cattle was inaccurate. Had the trial court not misread the May
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8, 1995 Trust Allocation, it is likely it would have found that there were 100 mixed bred
cows on George's date of death. Its finding that there were 50 head of cattle on May 8,
1995 is clearly erroneous as to both the relevant date and the number of cattle that Brent
converted.
d.

The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Valuing the
Converted Cattle at $550 per head.

Although the trial court placed the conversion as occurring on May 8, 1995, it used
the updated appraisal from the February 22, 1997 letter as the basis for its valuation of the
cattle on May 8, 1995. It stated:
While the Court does not give weight to the 1977 [sic] appraisal as to the
number of cattle, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the valuations.
The 1997 valuation of older cattle was $550.00 for cattle seven to eight
years old. Based upon the evidence before the Court, the Court will value
the 50 head at $550.00 a head, or $27,500.00.
R.536, %8. In choosing to value the cattle based on their value in February 1997, the Trial
court erred as a matter of law.
"As a general rule, the measure of damages for the conversion of property is the
value of the property at the time of the conversion, plus interest." Broadwater v. Old
Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993). The exceptions to this general rule
provide greater damages when the converted asset fluctuates in value. Id. In this case,
the Fishers sought "the value of the [cattle] at the time of conversion, plus interest."
R.379-80. Using a valuation of the cattle done 21 months after the trial court's
conversion date or nearly 5 years after the actual conversion date was an error of law.
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Had the trial court correctly held that the conversion took place on April 18, 1992,
there was unrebutted evidence as to the valuation of the cattle on that date. See T. 162:3163:1 (Brent's testimony that cattle valued at $840); T.Exh. 15 at 4 (identifying date of
death value of cattle). Moreover, the trial court agreed that the initial appraisal valued the
cattle at $840.00 per head.
Prior to the 1995 allocation, the Trust assets had been appraised (in late
1992 or early 1993). This appraisal listed, as a Trust assets, 50 head of
cattle with a value of $42,000.00.
R.535,1J5.
Based on its belief that the conversion date was May 8, 1995, the trial court
rejected the use of the 1992 appraisal. Based on the correct conversion date, the trial
court should have valued 100 head of cattle at $840.00 per head for a total value on the
date of conversion of $84,000.00.
2.

The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law When it Gave Brent a Credit for
Property Taxes and Water Assessments He Paid While Converting the Use of
the Fisher Trust's Land.
In arriving at its computation of damages for Brent's conversion of the Fisher

Trust's land, the trial court granted Brent a credit for monies he allegedly paid for
property taxes and water assessments. After noting that Brent's Accounting was
inherently unreliable, the trial court ruled:
However, the stated amounts which were paid for Dry Gulch Water, Indian
Water, and taxes are readily verifiable through public or corporate records.
These amounts are properly offset against amounts owed for rent. The
Court will find that Brent Fisher paid a total of $19,954.28 for water and
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taxes. . . . Therefore, he is entitled to [19,954.28] as an offset against rent
owed.
R.536-37, T|9.
The trial court computed damages based on the fair market rental value of the trust
land that Brent converted. R. 537-39. Granting Brent a credit for payments for property
taxes and water assessments is erroneous as a matter of law. These offsets are
permissible only when the beneficiary seeks damages against the trustee based on the
trustee's net profits. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §205, comment I (1959). In those
circumstances, the trustee's net profit is based on gross income less expenses, and
property taxes and water assessments are expenses that would reduce the gross profit.
However, when the claim is based on the fair market rental value of the land, there is no
grounds for an offset. Instead, these yearly payments of property taxes and water
assessments are beneficial to the property owner (or more accurately, the property
converter) in the year made. In the absence of a claim for damages based on Brent's net
profits, it is error to give him any credit for payments that personally benefitted him in his
use of the converted land.
Moreover, by referring to the ability to verify payments through "public or
corporate records," the trial court erroneously placed the burden on the Fishers to
establish that these payments were not made or were different than the amount reported.
That was not their burden. Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 60, 404 P.2d 253, 258 (Utah
1965); Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 83. Duty To Keep Records And Provide Reports
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(Current through August 2008); id, comment a. If made, those payments should have
been included in the 1,575 pages of documents that were in the courtroom during the trial.
T.80-91. It was Brent's responsibility to find the check or voucher and present it to the
court in order to obtain credit for the expenditure. Id. Since he did not do so, for this
reason the trial court also erred in giving Brent a credit for these payments.
3,

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Award Attorney
Fees Against Brent Fisher Personally.
The trial court abused its discretion because it failed to consider: (I) The

prohibition against self-dealing and its crucial role in keeping trustees from using trust
assets for their personal benefit; (ii) The duty that a trustee has to account for its
administration, particularly when the trustee is guilty of converting trust assets to the
trustee's own use and benefit; and (iii) In deciding not to award attorney fees, the
inadequacy of its "Prevailing Party" analysis under the circumstances of this case.
a.

The Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Crucial Role the
Prohibition Against Self-dealing Plays as a Deterrent to
the Trustee's Use of the Trust for His Personal Benefit.

"The prohibition against self-dealing does not depend upon proof of bad faith, but
is absolute so as to avoid the possibility of fraud and the temptation of self-interest"
Wheeler ex. rel Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted;
emphasis added). A trustee who purchases trust property for itself or leases trust property
to itself, even if the trustee pays fair market value, is guilty of breaching the duty of
loyalty and the prohibition against self dealing. George Gleason Bogert, George Taylor
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Bogert, Amy Morris Hess, Bogert's Trusts And Trustees, § 543, "Trustee's Duty of
Loyalty to the Beneficiaries," (Current through 2008 update). Here Brent simply took the
Trust's cattle without any compensation whatsoever. R.536, ^|8. He used the Trust's land
with limited compensation. R.537, f9. Brent was the epitome of the trustee who could
not be trusted. His conduct showed disdain for his duty of loyalty, the prohibition against
self-dealing, and other duties that his obligation to act with loyalty and care.
The development of the absolute prohibition against self-dealing as a restraining
force on trustee conduct mirrors the changing use of trusts themselves. Initially, trustees
were:
mostly stakeholders for ancestral land,. . . kept tightly in check by being
disabled from doing much with the trust property. . . . The trustees had only
those powers that the trust instrument expressly granted, which were
typically few, since the trustees' job was simply to hold and then to convey
to the remainderpersons.
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 Yale L.J. 625, 640
(1995) (emphasis added).
As more complex forms of property developed, the restrictive approach to keeping
trustees in check gave way to statutes that empowered trustees to deal with new financial
conditions and markets. As a result:
The need for active administration of the modern trust portfolio of financial
assets rendered obsolete this scheme of disempowering the trustee to
transact with the trust property. . . . Empowering the trustee to transact
freely in the financial markets has shifted the locus of protection for
beneficiaries from powers law to fiduciary law. Whereas disempowerment
prevented the trustee from acting, modern trustees' powers law confers vast
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managerial discretion. Discretion entails the risk of harm as well as the
opportunity to enhance the trust assets.
Id. at 641-42 (emphasis added). To protect against the misuse of the broad powers
granted trustees to manage trusts, the law strictly enforces the prohibition against selfdealing and the trustee's duty of loyalty.
Without a deterrent to misconduct, 'the problem is that [the] trustee lacks a direct
financial incentive to act with loyalty and care in managing the trust fund." Jesse
Dukeminier, Stanley M. Johanson, James Lindgren, and Robert H. Sitkoff, Wills, Trusts,
and Estates, Aspen Publishers, 7th Ed. 2005, at 771. Indeed, absent a significant
deterrent, the trustee has a strong financial incentive to act disloyally.
One solution to this systemic problem would be to require every trust to be monitor
by a government official. But because that approach would be far too cumbersome and
expensive, it is better to enforce the prohibition against self-dealing and the duty of
loyalty strictly in order to deter fiduciary misconduct.
[T]he fiduciary obligation [comprising the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care] also serves to reduce the economic costs associated with conducting
complex commercial transactions. One prestigious team of scholars has
described the process this way: "The fiduciary principle is an alternative to
direct monitoring. It replaces prior supervision with deterrence, much as the
criminal law uses penalties for bank robbery rather than pat-down searches
of everyone entering banks."
Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: an Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the
Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 719, 734-35, Fall 1994 (citations
omitted).
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Justice Benjamin Cardozo understood the pivotal role the duty of undivided loyalty
fulfills in insuring appropriate fiduciary conduct.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior. .. . Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude
of court's of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus
has the level of conduct by fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). Utah trial courts should heed
Justice Cardozo's concluding statement: "[The level of conduct by fiduciaries] will not be
consciously lowered by any judgment of this court." Id.
In this case, the trial court excused Brent's misconduct, setting the "level of
conduct" for Brent even lower than that "trodden by the crowd." In its July 13, 2006
Ruling, the trial court never identified any duty that Brent breached. There is no
reference to "duty," "loyalty," or "self dealing" anywhere in the decision. R. 534-42.
The trial court used the word "obligation" only when it was defending Brent's
misconduct:
Having said that, the Court does recognize that Brent Fisher has not acted or
engaged in any conduct which approaches malicious or intentional conduct.
His conduct with respect to the cattle and rent was born of a good faith,
albeit mistaken belief as to his rights and obligations with respect to the
Trusts.
R. 537.
This ruling is truly amazing. During the trial, based on questioning by the Fishers
(T.158:23-59:l), by his own counsel T.281:i6-18), and by the trial court (T.208:8-17;
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210:23-211:6), Brent testified the Fisher Trust owned no cattle at the time of George's
death. In holding Brent converted 50 head of cattle on May 8, 1995, the trial court
rejected that testimony. R.536, ^J8. The trial court does not explain how Brent could
testify falsely that the Fisher Trust owned no cattle and could convert the Fisher Trust's
cattle and land to his own use "unintentionally" and "in a good faith belief as to his rights
and obligations." The trial court abused its discretion in ignoring this crucial evidence.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted Judge Cardozo's view of the duty of loyalty.
A trustee's duty of loyalty requires the trustee to administer the trust "solely
in the interest of the beneficiary." As such, a trustee is not permitted to
engage in self-dealing, or "to place himself in a position where it would be
for his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries." The prohibition
against self-dealing does not depend upon proof of bad faith, but is absolute
so as to avoid the possibility of fraud and the temptation of self-interest.
Wheeler, 763 P.2d at 760 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also
Callister v. Callister, 15 Utah 2d 380, 387, 393 P.2d 477, 481 (Utah 1964) (fn. 8, quoting
Meinhard regarding the fiduciary duty of a court appointed executor).
The trial court's failure to understand and strictly apply the absolute prohibition
against self-dealing and the duty of loyalty caused it to excuse the inexcusable. Had the
trial court given proper deference to the role of the absolute prohibition against selfdealing in restraining fiduciary misconduct, it would not have abused its discretion in
denying the Fishers' claim that attorney fees be assessed against Brent personally.
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b.

The Trial Court Erred by Improperly Excusing Brent's
Failure to Produce Documentary Evidence He Was
Ordered to Produce.

Under Utah law: "It is [the trustee's] duty to keep full, accurate and orderly
records. When any question arises as to their sufficiency or accuracy, the burden is upon
him to show the correctness of his accounts; and doubts may be resolved adversely to
him." Walker, 17 Utah 2d at 60, 404 P.2d at 258. When a trustee self-deals, an accurate
accounting by the trustee gives the beneficiaries and the court the opportunity to calculate
the damages done to the trust and make it whole. On the other hand, a trustee who
refuses to produce underlying documents can easily avoid the consequences of selfdealing if the trial court is not vigilant in enforcing fiduciary law.
Following the trial court's initial Ruling on July 13, 2006, and prior to the entry of
its Judgment, the Fishers filed a motion to correct an alleged error of law. R.543-46. In
part, the Fishers argued that the burden of producing records in support of Brent's
Accounting was on Brent. R.553-55. In denying that motion, the Trial court stated in

The Court was never asked to make a finding that Brent Fisher violated his
duties as a trustees [sic] to keep records, and did not do so. Indeed, in its
October 31, 2005 Ruling, the Court indicated that the allegations that there
were additional documents which were not provided, were mere
conclusions. The Court then invited the movants in this motion to file a
Motion to Compel, which was, in the Court opinion, the proper procedural
tool to resolve that issue. At trial counsel for the movant in this motion
indicated that he had decided to forego further attempts to locate documents
and had instead decided to go to trial on the facts which they then had.
Having made the decision to go forward without resolving the issues of
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whether there were additional document, the movant cannot now claim that
there were additional documents, and that Brent Fisher should be penalized
for not producing them.
R.600-601. The trial court was thoroughly mistaken both as to the facts and the law.
In closing arguments, the Fishers' counsel argued initially and at several times
thereafter that Brent had a duty to keep and produce accurate supporting documentation.
See H.5-7, 77-81, 90, 97; see H.81:22-25. As shown by the following exchange with
Brent's counsel, the trial court (as well as opposing counsel) appeared to understand and
agree with the Fishers' argument:
THE COURT: The duty of the trustee is to account, is to maintain accurate
records.
MR. HILL: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Now, what you are telling me is, is that your guy cannot
keep the records and they can't recover because they can't prove. And I
think what [the Fishers' counsel] said is probably true, is that once they
show, for instance, an amount coming in, then it becomes the responsibility
of the trustee to show how it was dealt with because no one else could do
that, could they?
MR. HILL: You are probably correct, Your Honor . . . .
H.41:16-42:2.
Moreover, while it might be said that the trial court invited the Fishers to file a
new motion to compel, at the same time, it clearly encouraged them to proceed to trial.
The problems that the movants see in Mr. Brent Coopers [sic] response are
more properly addressed in a motion to compel. The original petition was
for an accounting. This Petition was filed almost two years ago. I would
suggest that the parties proceed as quickly as possible to the point where the
Court can schedule an evidentiary hearing to consider the issue of whether
and [sic] accounting should be ordered.
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R.326.
Thus, where Brent had a duty to account and to keep accurate records (Walker v.
Walker, supra), where the trial court had ordered him to produce all supporting
documentation (R.269-73), where Brent had averred that he had produced all of the
records he was required to produce (R.277), the Fishers chose to follow the trial court's
recommendation to proceed to trial. Brent's production had not been in response to a
Rule 34 document request. Utah R. Civ. P. 34. Had the Fishers filed and the trial court
granted a motion to compel, the trial court's order of enforcement would have been no
different than the stipulated order already entered. R.269-73. Accordingly, the Fishers
filed a Rule 16 Motion seeking a hearing date on "whether Brent Fisher's accounting
should be approved and whether Brent Fisher should be surcharged for damages for
breach of fiduciary duty." R.350.
Moreover, the Fishers never suggested to the trial court that they were assuming
any responsibility for unproduced records. At the inception of the trial, the trial court
stated its belief that the hearing was to determine whether it should order Brent to file an
accounting. Counsel for the Fishers responded:
Your Honor, I believe the evidence will show that ordering an accounting
will not be effective. We [are] prepared to go forward on the petition that
we originally filed which included a request for return of property and
damages; so that's our preparation for today.
What I envision today, Your Honor, is that we will present the information
that has been given to us by Brent Fisher. We'll show the deficiencies in
that information. We will then calculate what damages flows [sic] as a
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result of the deficiencies. And then we'll hear from Mr. Fisher and his
Counsel and decide the case.
R.8:15-20; 9:6-12.
Thus, there is no basis for the trial court's underlying assumption that proceeding
to trial in these circumstances shifted the burden of production to the Fishers. The trial
court basically excused Brent's failure to comply with its order to produce all records
without justification.
As noted above, Cloward's Appraisal Service prepared an appraisal on all of the
assets of the Fisher Trust on November 12, 1992. T. Exh. 17. However, Brent Fisher did
not produce that document. T.80-91. That appraisal would have conclusively established
the character and number of cattle that the Fisher Trust owned at George's date of death.
Without that appraisal, the Fishers were forced to use related documents to establish the
number of cattle at the date of death and their value. In analyzing the weight to be given
the evidence before it, the trial court should have kept in mind that the best evidence was
not available because the trustee had failed to produce it.
Accordingly, the Fishers did argue that Brent had a duty to keep and produce
accurate records, and the trial court apparently agreed with their position. H.41:16-42:2.
It should have held so in its July 13, 2006 "Ruling." By ruling to the contrary (R.600-01),
the trial court set the stage for its abusive decision denying the Fishers' claim that Brent
personally pay their attorney fees.
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c.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Not Awarding Attorney
Fees Against Brent Personally,

In trust litigation, a trial court has discretion to "'decide whether an award of
attorney fees is 'appropriate in the interest(s) of justice and equity' in any given case."
Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, f22, 89 P.3d 148. ll In exercising its discretion, the trial
court's "obligation is to effectuate a result that serves equity given the overall fact and
circumstances of the individual case." Id., Tf24. The trial court's decision is due
"considerable deference" because it is "in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole . . .." Id., f24, fn.2 (citing
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932-936 (Utah 1994)).
Notwithstanding the discretion afforded the trial court in Hughes, the Supreme
Court has refined in subsequent cases the pasture analysis in State v. Pena cited in
Hughes. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^25, 144 P.3d 1096. As a result, in determining the
amount of discretion to accord the trial court, the appellate court considers:
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule
is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the
legal rule relies on "facts" observed by the trial judge, Wwsuch as a witness's
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot
be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts;" and (3)
other "policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial
courts."

11

The misconduct in this case occurred between 1992 and 2001. Thus, the
Fishers have not referred to Utah Code Ann. §75-7-1004, Attorne> Fees and Costs,
enacted in 2004. See Utah Code Ann. §75-7-1103(3). Regardless, the Fishers believe the
Court of Appeals would reach the same result under that statute.
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Id. Here, the trial court did not resolve this matter based on matters that fall within the
trial court's special purview. Instead, the trial court used a mechanical comparison of the
damages sought with the damages obtained in denying attorney fees. R.540. Importantly,
the trial court showed no concern for the nature of the trustee's misconduct and how that
conduct affected the very test it applied. Further, it failed to consider that: "The
prohibition against self-dealing does not depend upon proof of bad faith, but is absolute
so as to avoid the possibility of fraud and the temptation of self interest."

Wheeler ex.

rel. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted; emphasis added).
When it comes to insuring that the "prohibition against self-dealing . . . is absolute," this
Court is equally, if not better, suited to protect that bedrock of fiduciary law. Where a
trustee is guilty of self-dealing, the trustee's culpability should be a central focus of the
trial court's decision on the award of fees. Hughes, ^[29, fn.5.
By comparing the damages sought with those obtained, the trial court denied the
Fishers' claim for attorney fees because "it is not apparent that [the Fishers] were the
prevailing parties on any issue." R.540. The trial court apparently used the "flexible and
reasoned approach" for determining who is the "prevailing party." A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270. While the use of a "flexible and
reasoned approach" has been approved in awarding fees under both contracts and
statutory provisions, all of the reported cases involve conflicting claims between the
defendant and the plaintiff or between multiple parties, where each had a partial victory
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and a partial loss. See, e.g., J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39,ffi[9-24,116
P.3d353.
The "flexible and reasoned approach" traces its origin to a contract dispute that
required attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party. Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989), at 556 fn.7. Although using
the "net judgment rule" under the facts of that case to identify the "prevailing party," the
Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he determination of a 'prevailing party' becomes even
more complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties," and it identified several
cases where "a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding . . . who actually is the
'prevailing party'" would be appropriate. Id.
But prior to discussing the "flexible and reasoned approach," the Court of Appeals
noted:
Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for purposes of awarding fees
and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if
plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, defendant has
prevailed.
Id. at 555. Where the Fishers established that Brent breached his duty of loyalty and the
prohibition against self dealing, where Brent did not comply with his duties to account
and to produce documents pursuant to a court order, and where the Fishers recovered over
$100,000 in damages for the benefit of the trust estate (R.790-91), there should be no
question that the Fishers prevailed. Importantly, the Fishers achieved this result
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notwithstanding Brent's failure to account and produce the documents he was ordered to
produce.
Even if the "flexible and reasoned approach" is appropriate in this case, Utah
appellate courts have repeatedly stated that its application is based on "the notion that
courts should not ignore common sense when deciding which party prevailed." A.K. & R.
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, \ 11, 94 P.3d 270. Here the trial court
used a mechanical comparison of amounts claimed with amounts awarded without any
consideration of the context in which those claims were made and the importance of
holding Brent accountable for failing to produce documents he was ordered to produce.
Had Brent produced the documents as ordered, R.269-73, the Fishers would have
made no claim to $170,566.00. See Stipulation R.506-33 (the documents showing what
happened to those funds). After the close of evidence and based on Brent's failure to
produce the documents as ordered, the Fishers sought those damages. R.379-89. The
trial court ignored the obvious benefit that inured to Brent by not producing documents he
was ordered to produce. Instead, it reopened the evidence so that Brent could submit the
documents he had been ordered to produce. H.101. Its action bordered on an abuse of
discretion, but in any event, it defies common sense for the trial court to then claim that
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Brent prevailed on that issue. He "prevailed" as a direct result of his failure to comply
with a court order.12
In this case, Brent was guilty of converting valuable trust assets and failing to
account. The trial court should have considered first and foremost Brent's "degree of
culpability." Hughes, f29, fn. 5. Where it failed to even consider that issue, the Court of
Appeals should review its decision and correct this error. Even under the abuse of
discretion standard, given the importance of enforcing the fiduciary obligation as a
deterrent to fiduciary misconduct, the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding
attorney fees and expenses against Brent personally. Neither the Fisher Trust, the Marital
Trust, nor the Family Trust is made whole for Brent's disloyal conduct unless Brent also
pays the attorney fees incurred in bringing his misconduct to light.
CONCLUSION
The Fishers ask the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's decision as
follows:

12

The trial court advised the parties at the start of closing arguments that it was
taking the motion to reopen under advisement. H.3-4. At the end of the argument, the
trial court then granted the motion to reopen. H. 101. During closing arguments, the
Fishers did note that the trial court could conform the pleadings to the evidence. H.78.
The trial court found that Brent had not accounted for oil and gas royalties received by the
Fisher Trust. R. 537. Nonetheless, it did not award any damages for that failure.
Compare T.Exh. 6, Form 1099 Misc for Linmar Petroleum showing $10,960.37 in income
to the Fisher Trust in 1993 with T.Exh. 1 (no income in 1993).
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1.

Order the trial court to recompute the damages for Brent Fisher's

conversion of the cattle by holding that Brent converted 100 head of cattle with a value of
$84,000.00 on April 18, 1992;
2.

Order the trial court to recompute the damages for Brent Fisher's

conversion of the ranch and farm land by disallowing the credits for property taxes and
water assessments;
3.

Order the trial court to award the Fishers all of their reasonable attorney

fees and expenses and order Brent to pay such fees personally; and
4.

Remand for the recalculation of damages and the determination of

reasonable attorney fees and expenses.
Dated this / / d a y of December, 2008.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Charles M^Bennett
Attorneys for Appellants, Michael and
Kim Fisher
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Attorneys for Kim Fisher and Michael Fisher
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE:

JUDGMENT
Probate No. 043800019

GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY
INTER VIVOS REVOCABLE TRUST,

Judge Payne

An Irrevocable Trust.
On March 16, 2006, the Court, the Honorable A Lynn Payne presiding, held a bench trial
on the Petition of Kim Fisher, Michael Fisher,1 and Susan Thacker entitled: "Petition for Order
Requiring Trustee Brent E. Fisher to Provide a Complete and Full Accounting, to Return to the
Trust All Assets Improperly Distributed from the Trust, and to Pay the Trust for Use of Assets or
for Assets that Have Been Improperly Lost or Otherwise Diminished in Value" (the "Petition").
Charles M. Bennett of Blackburn & Stoll, LC appeared for the Petitioners, and Chnstopher S.
Hill of Kirton & McConkie appeared for the Trustee, Brent E. Fisher (the "Respondent").
On March 16, 2006, the Court received evidence and each party rested Due to time
constraints, the Court set April 25, 2006 as the date for the parties to make their closing

1

Collectively, Kim and Michael are referred to in this pleading as the "Petitioners "
Susan K Thacker did not participate in the trial

RECEIVED
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arguments. It further ordered the Petitioners prepare and file a calculation of the damages due the
Trust.
Thereafter, Petitioners filed their damage calculations. Upon receipt of the damage claim,
Trustee Brent E. Fisher ("Respondent") filed a motion to reopen the trial to receive new
evidence. Petitioners opposed Respondent's motion. At the hearing on April 25, 2006 that had
originally been scheduled for closing arguments, the Court first considered Respondent's motion.
Following arguments, the Court granted Respondent's motion to reopen. Following the Court's
ruling, the Court heard closing arguments that were scheduled to be heard at that time.
Thereafter, Petitioners and Respondent stipulated as to what the new evidence would be.
Stipulation Re: Admittance of Evidence, dated May 31, 2006. The Court then received into
evidence the Stipulation with its attached affidavits and exhibits.
On July 13, 2006, the Court issued its Ruling in this matter. The Ruling granted the
Petitioners' petition in part, denied it in part, and held that there would be no award of attorney
fees.
Prior to the entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Judgment, Petitioners
filed their Rule 59 Motion to Amend the Court's July 13, 2006 Ruling. After the briefing of this
issue was completed, the Court thereafter considered and denied Petitioners' Motion for the
reasons set forth the Court's Ruling dated October 2, 2006.
Based on the Court's rulings, Petitioners prepared and served on Brent Fisher their
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. Thereafter, on March 1, 2007,
Brent Fisher filed his objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
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Judgment. On March 20, 2007, Petitioners filed their Memorandum in Support of the proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a notice to submit.
On May 1, 2007, the Court entered its ruling resolving the dispute. Thereafter, on May 8,
2007, Petitioners filed their objection to part of the Court's May 1st Ruling. On May 24, 2007,
Brent Fisher filed his Memorandum in opposition to the Petitioner's Objection, and on June 1,
2007, the Petitioners filed their Reply Memorandum and their Notice to Submit.
On November 16, 2007, the Court entered its Order resolving the Petitioners' Objection.
In light of the Court's written rulings in this matter on July 13, 2006, October 2, 2007, May 1,
2007 and November 16, 2007, the Court has determined that those decisions collectively
shall constitute its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Having therefore now executed its
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court is now prepared to enter its Judgment in this
matter.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
1.

The Petitioners' Petition is granted in part and denied in part, as more fully set

forth below.
2.

Respondent breached his fiduciary duties as Trustee of the George Fisher Jr.

Family Inter Vivos Revocable Trust (the "Trust") by converting 50 head of the Trust's cattle to
himself and by using real property owned by the Trust for his own personal benefit without
paying rent.
3.

In satisfaction of Petitioners' claim as to cattle owned by the Family Trust created

under the Trust, judgment is granted against Respondent and in favor of the Family Trust as
follows:
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a.

Respondent is hereby ordered to pay $ 16,500 to the trustees of the Family

b.

Additionally, Respondent is hereby ordered to pay prejudgment interest to

Trust.

the Family Trust on $16,500.00, less any payments made by Brent Fisher, from May 8,
1995, through November 30, 2006). Such interest through October 17, 2006 equals
$18,882.33
c.

Respondent shall pay Post Judgment interest on the unpaid amount of

these damages at the rate of 6.36% per year from December 1, 2006 until payment is
made in full to the Family Trust.
4.

In satisfaction of Petitioners1 claim as to cattle owned by the Marital Trust created

under the Trust, judgment is granted against Respondent and in favor of the Family Trust as
follows:
a.

Respondent is hereby ordered to pay $ 11,000 to the Marital Trust created

under the terms of the Trust.
b.

Additionally, Respondent is hereby ordered to pay prejudgment interest on

$11,000, less any payments made by Brent Fisher, from May 8, 1995, through November
30, 2006. Such interest through October 17, 2006 equals $12,588.22.
c.

Respondent shall pay Post Judgment interest on the unpaid amount of

these damages at the rate of 6.36% per year from December 1, 2006 until payment is
made in full to the Marital Trust.
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5.

In satisfaction of Petitioners' claim as to Respondent's use of the real property

owned by the Trust, judgment is granted against Respondent and in favor of the Family Trust and
the Marital Trust as follows:
a.

Respondent is ordered to pay $26,491.20 to the Trust, V2 to be paid to the

Family Trust and Vi to the Marital Trust. This represents rental payments less credits
granted to Respondent.
b.

Respondent is ordered to pay prejudgment interest on the rental payments

less credits, and less any payments made by Brent Fisher, through November 30, 2006.
Such interest through October 17, 2006 equals $29,706.87.
c.

Respondent shall pay Post Judgment interest on the unpaid amount of

these damages at the rate of 6.36% per year from December 1, 2006 until payment is
made in fall, with Vi to be paid to the Family Trust and Vi paid to the Marital Trust.
6.

The Court denies the Petitioners claims for damages for the $ 170,000.00 shown in

the Respondent's Accounting.
7.

Petitioners' claim for attorneys' fees to be assessed in favor of the Trust and

against Respondent personally is denied. The Court awards no attorney fees.
DATED this _2_ day of-Fe&ftr^, 2008.
BY THE COURT

The Honorable^. Lynn Payne
Eighth Judicial District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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KIRTON & McCONKIE

Christopher S. Hill
Attorneys for Brent E. Fisher
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Tab 2

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FILED
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

JUL 1 3 2006

In the Matter of the
Ruling

NNEMcKE
JOANNE
McKEE, CLERK
BY
Hi
.DEPUTY

Judge A. Lynn Payne

George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos
Revocable Trust,

Case No. 043800019
An Irrevocable Trust,

This matter was tried to the Court on March 16, 2006. The Court later agreed to take
additional evidence regarding allegations that Brent Fisher had converted $170,000.00 received
from the sale of trust lands.
1. The George Fisher Jr. Family Intervivos Trust was created on October 10, 1975 by
George Fisher Jr. The Trust provided that upon the death of either George Fisher Jr or his wife,
LaRue Fisher, Trust assets would be divided between a Family Trust and a Marital Trust. The
survivor would be the sole beneficiary of both the Marital and Family Trusts.
2. George Fisher Jr. Died on April 18, 1992, leaving his wife as the sole beneficiary of
the Trusts.
3. Brent Fisher served as a Trustee from his fathers death until August 18, 2001.
4. On May 8, 1995 LaRue Fisher and Brent Fisher allocated the properties held by the
original trust. The real property (200 acres of farm land and one-half interest in 320 acres of
ranch land) was divided equally between the Marital and Family Trusts. Fifty head of cattle was
divided, with 30 head (60%) going to the Family Trust and 20 heard (40%) going to the Marital
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Trust.
5. Prior to the 1995 allocation, the Trust assets had been appraised (in late 1992 or early
1993). This appraisal listed, as a Trust assets, 50 head of cattle with a value of $42,000.00. In
1997 a second appraisal was completed which listed 100 head of cattle having a value of
$55,000.00. Brent Fisher was aware of each appraisal and made no objection to the inclusion of
cattle in either appraisal. Brent Fisher was serving as Trustee at the time each appraisal was
prepared and should have contested the inclusion of cattle which did not exist.
6. On February 20, 2004 (which was after this action was filed) Brent Fisher and LaRue
Fisher acting as Trustees of the original Trust amended the 1995 allocation. The amendment
purportedly corrected the 1995 allocations statement that there were fifty head of cows and stated
that when George Fisher died, the Trust owned no cows.
7. Based upon the evidence the Court has no confidence that the 1997 appraisal
accurately reported the existence of 100 cows in the Trust. There is no evidence that the
appraiser, who lived in Colorado, ever came to Utah and observed or counted cows. Indeed the
evidence is that he did not. The Court accepts the testimony that the arrangement between Brent
Fisher and his father was that he keep the calf crop as partial compensation for his efforts and
labor in running the farming operation. Nevertheless, based on the original allocations, which
was signed by Brent Fisher and which attested to the ownership of 50 head of cows, the Court
finds that the trust owned 50 head of cows on May 8, 1995. Certainly Brent Fisher, who was
then operating the farm, knew or should have known, the number of cows. His statement
attesting to the existence of 50 head is strong and convincing evidence. Value is another issue.
The Court has not received any evidence as to the value of the cattle other than the 1992-1993
-2-

and 1997 appraisals. The Courts specific finding is that 50 cows were owned by the Trust in
May 1995. The agreement between Brent and his father (George Jr) pre dated the Trust. Based
upon this, the Court believes that many, if not all, of the cows remaining in the Trust in 1995
were older cows. The second appraisal properly reduces the values of older cows. Older cows
have a shorter remaining life expectancy and therefore less value as producing livestock. While
the Court does not give weight to the 1977 appraisal as to the number of cattle, there is no reason
to doubt the accuracy of the valuations. Valuation of cattle is readily available through existing
markets. The 1997 valuation of older cattle was $550.00 for cattle seven to eight years old.
Based upon the evidence before the Court, the Court will value the 50 head at $550.00 a head, or
$27,500.00. In doing so the Court must express some frustration with the fact that there was no
direct evidence as to valuation in 1995. However, based upon the evidence before the Court, I
am comfortable that this is the most accurate figure available to the Court.
8. These cattle are no longer held by the Trust and there has been no explanation as to
their disposition or accounting for proceeds received. The agreement between Mr. Brent Fisher
and his father (George) was that the Trust would receive the proceeds as the Trust cows were
culled from the herd. The Court will therefore find that Mr. Brent Fisher appropriated the sum of
$27, 500.00 from the Trust and that judgement should enter in favor of the family trust for
$16,5000.00 (60%) and $11,000.00 (40%) for the Marital trust.
9. The Court has received into evidence exhibit one. With the exception of expenses for
Dry Gulch Water, Indian Water, and taxes, the Court has little confidence in the accuracy of the
amounts set forth on this exhibit. The Court does not believe that the amounts relating to the
income and expense relating to the farm are highly relevant to the issues before the Court. Brent
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Fisher was clearly not operating the farm in his capacity as Trustee, he was operating it for
himself. Indeed that very fact gives rise to the claim that he should have paid rent. The
profitability of the Farm therefore does not help resolve the issues before the Court. In addition,
the Court does not, with the exception noted above, have confidence in the accuracy of the
amounts stated. Oil Royalties were clearly earned which were not listed. The data used to
prepare the reports was not verified or documented by Mr. Aycock. However, the stated amounts
which were paid for Dry Gulch Water, Indian Water, and taxes are readily verifiable through
public or corporate records. These amounts are properly offset against amounts owed for rent.
The Court will find that Brent Fisher paid a total of $19,954.28 for water and taxes. The Court
will also find that Brent Fisher paid $10,000.00 as rent in 1996. Therefore, he is entitled to
$29,954.28 as an offset against rent owed.
10. Brent Fisher clearly used Trust lands for his farming operation. He should therefore
pay a reasonable amount for using the land. Brent Fisher believes he should not have to pay rent
because he was operating the farm and maintaining the land as a viable farming operation. In the
process of operating the farm he did maintain the land so that its value as a farm was maintained.
However, his efforts can not be readily distinguished from the efforts of any renter of farm lands.
If the land would have been rented to another, the Trust would have received similar if not
identical benefits. The Court can not give him additional credit based upon his efforts to farm
the Trust Lands. Having said that, the Court does recognize that Brent Fisher has not acted or
engaged in any conduct which approaches malicious or intentional conduct. His conduct with
respect to the cattle and rent was born of a good faith, albeit mistaken belief as to his rights and
obligations with respect to the Trusts..
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11. The Ranch land had a rental value of 7.50 an acre. The Trust was the owner of a 54
interest in the 320 acres. The Trust was therefore entitled to $1, 200.00 a year for its ownership
interest in the ranch land (7.5 X 320 = 1200.00) a year.
2
12. The rental value of the farm land is much more difficult. The testimony as to value
of the farm land was:
a). Clark property - 90 acres leased (one-half ranch - one-half farm) - for
$1,500.00. The Court believes that 7.50 an acre is a reasonable rent for ranch lands. 45 acres at
7.50 would represent rent of $337.50 for the ranch. This would leave $1,162.50 ($1500.00 $337.30 = $1162.50) as rent for 45 acres of farm land. The farm land would then be rented for
$25.83 an acre ($1162.59/45 = 25.83).
b). Carrol property - 200 acres leased (150 farm and 50 ranch) for from 3,000 to
5,000 depending on the year. Valuing the ranch land at 7.50, there would be rent on 50 acres of
375.00 (50 X 7.5 = 375). Using an average rent of 4000.00, the amount of rent for the farm land
would be 24.17 an acre (4000 - 375 = 3650/150 = 24.17).
c). Michael Fisher property - one years lease of 80 acres of farm land for 5000 or
62.50 an acre.
13. Obviously every piece of land is to some extent, unique. The value of a particular
parcel for rental purposes would fluctuate over time based upon such considerations as demand,
weather, and availability of water to raise crops. Although there was evidence introduced as to
comparable leases (see above), there was no direct testimony as to how the trust land compared
to the comparables. The per acre rent paid for the Michael Fisher property is not convincing. It
was for only one year and was more than two times the amounts paid for other farm land which
-5-
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was rented over many years. Based upon the evidence, the Court will find that the farm land had
a value of $25.00 an acre per year, or $5,000.00 a year (25 X 200 = 5,000).
14. The Petitioners claim that the Trust should have been paid rent from April 18, 1992
(the date George Fisher Jr died) until May 26, 2001 (the date the Trust distributed farm and ranch
lands). See calculation of damages submitted by Petitioners dated March 31, 2006. This is 9
years 1 month and 8 days. Rent is therefore:
Ranch:

For 9 years
1,200x9=
$10,800.00
For 1 month 1,200 /12 =
100.00
For 8 days
1,200/365 =
26.30
Total
$10,926.30

Farm:

For9years 5,000x9=
For 1 month 5,000/12 =
For 9 days 5,000/365 =
Total

$45,000.00
416.67
109.59
$45,526.26

Total Rent Due: For Ranch land
For Farm land

$10,926.30
$45.526.26
$56,452.56
As previously stated, Brent Fisher paid water assessments, taxes, and rent totally

$29,954.28. The Court finds that under the circumstances presented in this case the taxes and
water assessment were expenses of the Trust. Brent Fisher is therefore entitled to a credit in the
amount of $29, 954.28. The total amount which is owing as rent is $26,498.28 (Total rent due of
56,452.56 less allowed credits paid of $29,954.28 = $26,498.28). This amount should be split
equally between the Marital and Family Trust pursuant to the 1995 allocation.
15. In 1996 the Trust received $170,000.00 from the sale of Trust property. One half of
this amount was distributed directly to LaRue Fisher. Taxes were paid from the remaining onehalf and, after paying several Trust debts, all other proceeds were deposited in an 18 month
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certificate of deposit issued in the name of the Trust. This certificate renewed for an additional
18 months on February 12, 2000. Mr. Brent Fisher ceased to act as Trustee on August 18, 2001
and has accounted for all funds up to that time. There is no evidence that he has ever
misappropriated or otherwise converted liquid assets for his own use.
16. The Trust are entitled to pre-judgment simple interest (not compounded) for the cows
from and after May 10, 1995 and on the rent as the rent accrued yearly (with the credits for water,
taxes, and rent applied in the year paid).
17. The Court will not award attorney fees. There were three issues tried. The
petitioners claimed Brent Fisher converted $170,000.00 in cash. They did not prevail on this
issue. They claim he converted 100 cows having a value of $84,000.00. The Court found 50
cattle with a value of $27,500 which recovery is a little over 1/3 of the amount claimed. The
Plaintiffs claimed rent in the amount of over $123,000.00 (12,500 farm + 1,200 ranch = 13,700 x
9 years = 123,300), the Court found $56,452.56 which was less than one-half the amount
claimed. Although the Petitioners did obtain a recovery, it is not apparent that Petitioners were
the prevailing parties on any issue. Indeed, given the Courts ruling, Brent Fisher prevailed on
one issue and was successful in reducing the claims to less than lA on the other issues. He clearly
prevailed on the claim that he converted funds, his defense reduced the requested recovery on the
cows by 2/3 and the recovery on requested rent by over lA. Where claims are grossly overstated,
it is reasonable that a defense be made. Given all the circumstances in this case, no attorney fee
will be awarded.
DATED this

day of July, 2006.
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BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
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T
Judge
A. Lynn Eayns
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Benson L. Hathaway
Kirton & McConkie
POB 45120
Salt Lake City Utah 84145-0120

By depositing, postage prepaid in the US Post Office at Duchesne Utah 84021 on the

13^ day of
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By:
Pat Mullins
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FILED
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAftTRiCT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

UU 0 2 2006

In the Matter of the
Ru'*ng

JOANNE McKEE, CLER
B Y _ _ j T f r h v w .PEP

Judge A. Lynn Payne

George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter Vivos
Revocable Trust,

Case No. 043800019
An Irrevocable Trust,

The Court has received and reviewed the Motion of Kim and Michael Fisher to Amend
its July 13,2006 Ruling as well as response and reply which have been filed by the parties. This
motion is denied. This has been a difficult case for the parties and, as the Court stated in its
Ruling, for the Court. Basically the motion contends that the Court has entered findings contrary
to the weight of the evidence. Weighing evidence is however the responsibility of the finder of
facts (in this case the Court). After weighing the evidence the Court reached the finding and
conclusions announced in it's ruling. I recognize there is evidence which may have led the Court
in a different direction, but the Court must weight evidence and make conclusions according to
its findings. I believe that this was done in this case. This motion also assumes findings that the
Court did not reach. The Court was never asked to make a finding that Brent Fisher violated his
duties as a trustees to keep records, and did not do so. Indeed, in its October 31, 2005 Ruling,
the Court indicated that the allegations that there were additional documents which were not
provided, were mere conclusions. The Court then invited the movants in this motion to file a
Motion to Compel, which was, in the Court opinion, the proper procedural tool to resolve that

-1-

issue. At trial counsel for the movant in this motion indicated that he had decided to forego
further attempts to locate documents and had instead decided to go to trial on the facts which
they then had. Having made the decision to go forward without resolving the issues of whether
there were additional document, the movant can not now claim that there were additional
documents, and that Brent Fisher should be penalized for not producing them. Moreover, after
the case was initially presented additional critical documents were found which were not in
possession of Brent Fisher and were not available to him. This would make it difficult for the
Court to find that Mr. Brent Fisher had documents which he did not produce or that he failed to
keep records. Further, I think the movants confuse the law which relates to a trustee's
responsibilities with the rules which the Court must employee to determine who the prevailing
party was in order to decide the issue of attorney fees. The fact that the law imposes on a Trustee
an obligation is not dispositive as to whether a trustee who breaches his duty is always liable to
pay attorney fees. I believe that the Court has applied the appropriate process for determining
attorney fees and believe that fees are not appropriate given all of the facts and circumstances of
this case.
Finally, one of the difficulties in deciding this case was determining the date of
conversion. There was no direct evidence as to when conversion occurred. However, the Court
believed the testimony of Brent Fisher that he and his father agreed that Brent Fisher would keep
the calves and George Fisher would receive the proceeds from the sale of older cattle as they
were culled from the herd. There was no evidence as to when each individual animal was sold.
However, it is obvious that this did not occurred at one time, but was something that took place
over several years. Nor was there any evidence as to the value of older cattle at market. The
-2-

Court used the values and numbers of cattle that it felt was most convincing based upon a review
of the evidence.

DATED this

) -

day of

0*-h

, 2005.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

A:Lynn
Lyn/Fa
JudgesA.
Payne

-3-

boS

Certificate of Notification
I hereby certify that mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to the
following parties:

Blackburn & Stoll, LC
Charles M. Bennett
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Salt Lake City Utah 84111-2048
Benson L. Hathaway
Kirton & McConkie
POB 45120
Salt Lake City Utah 84145-0120
By depositing, postage prepaid in the US Post Office at Duchesne Utah 84021 on the
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
THE GEORGE FISHER, JR.
FAMILY INTER VIVOS
REVOCABLE TRUST

RULING
CASE NO. 043800019
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to a notice to
submit the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment (as submitted by Kim and Michael Fisher) and the objections to the same as submitted by Brent Fisher. In ruling on
the matter, the Court will address the objections of Brent
Fisher to the proposed pleadings.
HISTORY:
A brief history of the proceedings may be helpful in disposing of the issues before the Court. Trial in this matter
concluded on March 16, 2006. After the trial, the Court granted
Brent Fisher's motion to receive additional evidence and, after
considering such evidence, entered its ruling which was entered
July 13, 2006. After considering, and denying, a motion to
amend, the Court entered an additional ruling on October 02,
2006. After this second ruling, Mr. Bennett (counsel for Kim
and Michael Fisher) and Mr. Hill (counsel for Brent Fisher) communicated with each other regarding various issues relating to
this matter. The Court has reviewed the letters and email correspondences attached to Mr. Bennett's memorandum. For purposes
of the issues before the Court, the Court notes: 1) Mr. Hill
prepared a proposed order and mailed it to Mr. Bennett on October 09, 2006; 2) on October 16, 2006 Mr. Bennett objected to the
proposed order and acknowledged that because his clients were
entitled to relief under the Court's rulings he should prepare
the judgment; 3) on October 17, 2006, Brent Fisher tendered pay-

ment of $111,628.31 to Susan Thacker (as Trustee of the Trusts)
and such payment was accepted; 4) on October 17, 2006, Mr. Bennett communicated to Mr. Hill that Mr. Bennett would prepare the
judgment; 5) in response to #4 above, Mr. Hill communicated to
Mr. Bennett that Mr. Hill would await the preparation of the
judgment which Mr. Bennett had indicated that he would prepare;
6) beginning in September of 2006 and continuing to the end of
January 2007, Mr. Bennett suffered a series of medical problems
which prevented Mr. Bennett from working consistently. These
medical problems accounted for the delay in the preparation of
the proposed judgment. The judgment was not submitted to the
Court until March 20, 2007.
ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT:
Initially, the Court will determine whether either the July
13 ruling or the October 02 ruling constitute a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court will rule that neither ruling is a final judgment. Nothing in the text of the Court's rulings indicates that the Court
intended either ruling to constitute a final judgment. There
are no words or phrases which would reasonably place the parties
on notice that the entry of either ruling would begin the period
during which the parties must file their appeals. The documents
were titled as rulings, not as judgments or orders. The use of
the words "by order of the Court" by the clerk when using the
Court' s signature stamp does not transform a document designated
as a ruling (and which does not contain any wording putting the
parties on notice that it was a final order) into a final order.
Indeed, neither party initially viewed the ruling as a final order, as is evident by the fact that each party prepared proposed
judgments / orders.
POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST:
The Court will next address the issue of when post-judgment
interest should accrue. Under normal circumstances, postjudgment interest accrues from and after entry of the judgment.
However, the proposed final judgment in this case was not prepared and submitted for signature in a timely manner. The judgment should have been prepared and submitted based upon the

Court's July 13, 2006 ruling. Instead, Kim and Michael Fisher
filed a motion to amend the judgment. After the Court ruled on
the motion to amend, Mr. Hill initially took upon himself the
burden of preparing the judgment. When Mr. Bennett objected to
the language in the order prepared by Mr. Hill, Mr. Bennett
agreed to take the burden of preparing the judgment. He agreed
to prepare the judgment on October 17, 2006 and did not submit a
proposed judgment until February 20, 2007, more than four months
later. This does not constitute timely preparation of the order. While Mr. Bennett's failure to prepare the findings is
certainly understandable given his medical problems, the Court
cannot ignore the fact that this delay operates to the prejudice
of Brent Fisher, who is subject to the higher pre-judgment interest rate until a judgment is entered. Therefore, in order to
do justice (see Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure),
the Court will order that the post-judgment interest rate applies from and after December 01, 2006. This would have allowed
Mr. Bennett six weeks to complete the task he agreed to undertake and for the Court to rule on any issues necessary prior to
entry of judgment.
PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST:
As stated above, no final order or judgment has been entered in this case. In reviewing the issues which are now before the Court, it has been necessary for the Court to again
consider the issue of pre-judgment interest for damage relating
to the conversion of the proceeds received when trust cattle
were sold. The parties are in disagreement as to when prejudgment interest began and when it should end. To resolve this
issue, the Court has reviewed it's prior rulings and, based upon
this review, the Court questions whether pre-judgment interest
for the conversion of the cattle is appropriate under controlling law. Pre-judgment interest is appropriate from and after
the date when damages are complete and the amount of loss fixed
as to a particular time, so that interest can be computed with
mathematical accuracy. See Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379,
1387 (Utah 1995). With respect to the cattle, the Court has experienced difficulty finding a particular time when the damages
were sustained (i.e., when the damages became fixed). In this
matter, the Court accepted the testimony of Brent Fisher that

when his father no longer wished to run the farming operation,
they agreed that Brent Fisher would run the cattle operation and
pay the expenses associated with the cattle. In return, Brent
Fisher was entitled to keep the calves that were born. When the
existing cows were culled from the herd, George Fisher would received the proceeds from the sale.
Based upon the appraisal of Trust assets, the Court found
that the Trust owned 50 head of cattle on May 08, 1995. See
July 13, 2006 Ruling 7. The Court found that, as of the date of
trial, the Trust no longer owned any cattle and that Brent
Fisher had provided no explanation as to the disposition of the
cattle, nor had he accounted for any proceeds he received from
the sale of these Trust cattle. See id. at 8. Based upon this,
the Court valued the cattle and found that Brent Fisher had appropriated the sum of $27,500.00 from the Trust. The Court
authorized judgment in favor of the Trust in that amount. This
resolved the issue of whether Brent Fisher had converted the
cattle (or the proceeds from the sale of the cattle) and the
amount of damages. However, it did not resolve the issue as to
when the cattle were converted, which must be established before
the Court can determine the particular moment in time that damages became fixed.
Later, in the October 02, 2006 ruling, the Court noted that
it had experienced "difficulties in deciding . . . the date of
conversion.'' Obviously, damages for conversion would not accrue
until the cows were disposed of through sale or other means. As
long as the Trust cattle were under Brent Fisher's control in
the regular course of the cattle operation, no conversion occurred and no damages were established. The Court then noted
that the Court had received no evidence as to when each individual animal had been sold. Indeed, the record is void of any
evidence identifying to whom the cattle were sold or even when
the cattle might have been sold.
Based upon the evidence, the Court does not believe that it
has received evidence which the Court can rely upon to establish
a specific date of conversion. In its July 13, 2006 ruling, the
Court treated the conversion as taking place on May 08, 1995
(the date that the Trust properties had been allocated). How-

ever, upon reflection, there was no evidence presented to support May 08, 1995, as a date which any cattle were converted.
As stated above, there was no evidence to establish a specific
date for the conversion of cattle or for any single cow. The
Court would have to speculate to fix a date for the actual conversion of the cattle. The cows may have been converted or the
proceeds converted on May 08, 1995, or at any time after May 08,
1995. Moreover, as the Court noted in the October 02, 2006 ruling, it is likely that the cows were disposed of over a period
of years. In any event, the parties failed to present any evidence as to the date of conversion. Therefore, the Court cannot
fix a date upon which the damage occurred. Because the amount
of interest would depend on when the damages occurred, it appears that the Court would be prohibited from awarding prejudgment interest for damages associated with the conversion of
the cattle. Because this issue has been raised on the Court's
own initiative, the Court will invite the parties to provide the
Court with memoranda concerning the issue of pre-judgment damages for conversion of the cattle. If a party desires to submit
a memorandum, the memorandum is to be submitted within two weeks
of the mailing of this ruling. Responding and reply memoranda
are to be filed per Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
RENT:
As paragraph 64 of Mr. Bennett's proposed findings of fact
states, the evidence presented was that rent for farm land is
prepaid. Rent shall be calculated based upon a yearly rental of
$6,200.00, beginning April 18, 1992, and continuing each April
18 thereafter. Rent from April 18, 2001, to May 26, 2001, shall
accrue from April 18, 2001 for 38 days based upon a yearly
rental of $645.48 (38 / 365 x $6,200.00 = $645.48). As stated
in the July 13, 2006 ruling, Brent Fisher is entitled to offsets
against the accruing rents for $19,954.28 for water assessments
and taxes that were paid. Brent Fisher is also entitled to a
credit against accrued rent for the $10,000.00 rent he paid in
1996. In computing the on-going rent due, the offsets for water
assessments, taxes, and rent paid are to offset as of the date
paid. For the convenience of the parties, however, the Court
will allow Mr. Bennett to apply any offset paid after April 18
in each year as of April 18. For example, if there is a total

of $1,000.00 of offset from April 18, 2000 to April 18, 2001,
all offsets may be entered as of April 18, 2000, which would
mean that the total due for rent as of April 18, 2000, would be
$5,200.00 ($6,200.00 - $1,000.00 = $5,200.00). Interest is to
be computed on the basis of simple interest on the amount owed.
If offsets which occur during the year are not credited as of
April 18, the accruing interest will have to be adjusted as of
the date the payments are made. The $10,000.00 rental payment
will be applied against rent due in prior years and the interest
due for the prior years will need to be re-calculated for the
purpose of future pre-judgment interest.
The Court approve the language of paragraph eight of Mr.
Bennett's proposed conclusions of law and will approve such language in the judgment.
The Court instructs Mr. Bennett to calculate pre-judgment
interest based upon the above, but only after the Court has
ruled upon any issues that may be raised by the parties in memoranda concerning pre-judgment interest on the sale of the cattle. If memoranda are filed on the issue of pre-judgment interest, final judgment will be submitted after the Court's ruling
on the issues presented. If no memoranda are filed within the
time specified above, the final judgment should then be submitted to Mr. Hill and then to the Court, pursuant to the rules of
civil procedure.
Dated this

day of

, 2007.

BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
RULING AND ORDER
George Fisher, Jr. Family Inter
Vivos Revocable Trust,
Case No. 043800019
!

Judge A. LYNN PAYNE

The matter before the Court is whether prejudgment interest
should be awarded for the conversion of cattle.

The Court wishes to

apologize to the parties about the delay in its ruling.

When the

matter was submitted for decision on June 1, 2007, the file was not
given to the Court to review and rule upon.
An award of prejudgment interest is appropriate when the damages
are complete and the amount of loss is fixed as to a particular time
so that interest can be computed with mathematical accuracy.
v.

Wilcox,

Cornia

898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995).

One of the purposes of prejudgment interest is to deter people
from withholding an amount of money that is certain and owed.
Mt.

Coal

Co.

v.

Utah Div.

of

State

Lands

& Forestry,

Trail

921 P. 2d 1365,

1370 (Utah 1996).
Also, interest from the date of conversion is generally included
in an award of damages.

Broadwater

v.

1 Of 3

Old Republic

Sur.,

854 P.2d

527, 531 (Utah 1993) .
Here, the damages were complete upon Brent Fisher's conversion of
the cattle.

There is no dispute that Brent should be required to pay

interest from the date he converted the cows.
which he converted the cows is unknown.
the cattle.

However, the date in

Brent denies the existence of

Kim and Michael Fisher do not know the date conversion

occurred because, as beneficiaries, they were not in control of the
property.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined it fair to place the burden of establishing the date goods
were damaged on the wrongdoer when the date is unknown.
Inc.,

v.

1986).

Hudson

Tank

Terminals

Corp.,790

Mitsui

& Co.

F.2d 226, 231 (2nd. Cir.

There, oil was contaminated while in possession of a bailee

delivering goods from a seller to a buyer.

Id.

at 227. Consequently,

the date the damages occurred and the measure of damages was
uncertain.

The court concluded that a bailee in possession of goods

will know more about the circumstances of their damage than the
bailor.

Id.

at 231. The court further reasoned that a bailee in

possession of goods is in the best position to have access to proof
establishing or refuting the date the goods were damaged.
Here, the same policy reasons apply.

Id.

The information concerning

when the cows were sold was exclusively within Brent's possession as
trustee.

Brent is in the best position to confirm the date of
2 of 3

conversion, and to offer proof refuting the date.

Therefore, it is

fair to assign the burden of establishing when the conversion took
place

t

Pi I it .

Furthermore, awarding interest from the date of conversion should
act as a deterrent to those who would convert assets in their
possession.

Disallowing interest when the date of conversion is

unknown would work to encourage people to keep the date secret. A
person in Brent's position would be better off if they claimed they
did not kn HV when the conversion took place then if they did.

Such a

result would be unjust and contrary to the policy behind awarding
interest.

Therefore, the Court will order statutory prejudgment

interest for the conversion of the cattle starting from May 8, 1995
Mr. Bennett is to prepare a judgment consistent with the dbfwe
and the prior rulings of the Court.

The Court will adopt its rulings

(07-13-2006, 10-02-2006, 04-27-2007 and this ruling) as its findings
and conclusions in this matter.

Mr. Bennett does not need to prepare

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Dated this

day of

/

I i <iv* li<- ^

, 2007.

BY THE COURT:

O
A. LYNN PAYNE, District Court Judge
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TRUSTEES ALLOCATION OF THE PROPERTIES HELD UNDER
THE GEORGE FISHER, JR. FAMILY REVOCABLE
TRUST DATED OCTOBER 10, 1975

Pursuant to the death of GEORGE FISHER, JR. on April 18, 1992,
LaRUE FISHER and BRENT ELMER FISHER, as trustees of the abovementioned Trust, do hereby allocate the properties of said Trust
between the Family Trust Portion and Marital Trust Portion pursuant
to Article III of said Trust as follows:
The following property is allocated one-half to the Family Trust
Portion and one-half to the Marital Trust Portion:
For Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, LaRue Fisher and Brent Elmer Fisher, as trustees of
the above-mentioned Trust, hereby transfer, convey, assign and
deliver an undivided one-half interest to Brent Elmer Fisher,
trustee of the Family Trust Portion of the George Fisher, Jr.
Family Trust dated October 10, 1975, and the remaining undivided
one-half interest to LaRue Fisher, trustee of the Marital Trust
Portion of the George Fisher, Jr. Family Trust dated October 10,
1975, as grantees, all right, title, interest, and obligations
pertaining thereto, to the below-described properties:
1.
County, Utah:
A.

The

following real property

Township
Meridian

1 South, Range

situate

in Duchesne

4 West, Uintah

Special

Section 23:
Beginning 3 0 feet North of the Southeast corner of
the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter;
thence North 195 feet; thence West 198 feet; thence
South 107 feet; thence Southeasterly 159 feet;
thence East 90 feet to the point of beginning.
Contains 0.75 acre, more or less.

K. Fisher Exh.. 15.

2
*The value of said property at date of death of
decedent is $78,500.00.
B.

Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter, Section
13, Township 1 South, Range 4 West, U.S.M.
TOGETHER WITH all improvements and appurtenances
thereto belonging. Also: 4 0 acres of water rights
in the Indian Irrigation System.
EXCEPTING AND RESERVING therefrom all oil, gas and
other minerals.

C.

Uinta Meridian, Township 1 South, Range 4 West,
Section 24, NE^SWM, containing 4 0 acres.
TOGETHER WITH 4 0 acres of water rights in the Uinta
Irrigation Project.
Subject to the reservation hereby made of all oil,
gas and other minerals, together with the right to
lease, extract and retain the same.

D.

The South Half of the Northwest Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter (SMNW1XNE1X) Section 25, Township 1
South, Range 4 West, U.S.M., containing 20 acres
more or less, together with all improvements
thereon and all water rights thereunto belonging.

E.

West half of the Northwest quarter; Section 17,
Township 1 South, Range 3 West, Uintah Special
Meridian.
Together
with
improvements,
appurtenances, rights of way and water rights
thereunto belonging. Said water rights being more
particularly described as 3 5 shares of Dry Gulch
Irrigation Company.

F.

Township 1 South of Range 4 West of the Uintah
Special Meridian.
Section 25: NMNW^EMArea
20.00 acres.
TOGETHER
WITH
all
improvements
thereon
appurtenances thereunto belonging, including
water and water rights however evidenced.

and
all

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING one-half interest in and to
all oil, gas and other minerals, together with the
right of ingress and egress for the purpose of
mining and exploring for said mineral rights.
*The value of said parcels B., C , D., E., and F.,
known as the "farm land", is $153,000 at date of

3
death of decedent.
An
undivided
following:

one-half

Township 2 North,
Meridian:

Range

(M)

interest

5 West, Uintah

in

the

Special

Section 34:
South half of the North half of the North half of
the Northwest quarter;
North half of the South half of the Northwest
quarter of the Northwest quarter;
South half of the North half of the Northwest
quarter of the Northeast quarter;
South half of the North half of the Northeast
quarter;
North half of the Southwest quarter of the
Northeast quarter;
South half of the Northeast quarter of the
Northwest quarter;
East half of the Northeast quarter of the Southeast
quarter.
Section 35:
Northwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of the
Southwest quarter;
South half of the Northwest quarter of the
Southwest quarter: Lots 3 and 4.
TOGETHER WITH all improvements, rights of way and
water rights thereunto belonging, said water rights
being more particularly described as Application
No. 9383, certificated by Certificate No. 2272 of
the State of Utah, and Application No. 93 84,
certificated by Certificate No. 2273 of the State
of Utah.

An undivided one-half (M) interest in the following:
SE1XNE1X; Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 5 West,
USM.
*An undivided one-half (M) interest in parcels G.
and H. , known as the "Ranch", is valued at
$107,500.00 at date of death of decedent.

4
1.

SEM; Section 6, Township 1 South, Range 3 West,
U.S.M.
SMSWM; Section 6, Township 1 South, Range 3 Westf
U.S.M.
NMNEM; S W ^ E ^ ; NW1/; Section 7, Township 1 South,
Range 3 West U.S.M.
SWANEV<; NW^iNEK; Section 12, Township 1 South, Range
4 West, U.S.M.
TOGETHER WITH an Escrow Agreement dated May 1,
1S74, between George Fisher, Jr. and LaRue Fisher,
Sellers, and Max George Fisher and Joyce Fisher,
Buyers, pertaining to the above-described property.
*The value of said real property and/or contract or
Escrow Agreement, known as the "Max Fisher Farm",
at date of death of decedent is $192,000.00.

2.

Mineral rights as described in parcels
C , D.,
E., Sc F. of paragraph 1., and valued at $42,000.00
on date of death of decedent.

3.
The following accounts at the following financial
institution (values at date of death of decedent):
A.

First Security Bank
Checking Account No. 147 10034 16
Various Certificates of Deposit

Value
$10,130.00
70,191.00
$80,321.00

The following property is allocated forty percent (40%) to the
Marital Trust Portion and sixty percent (60%) to the Family Trust
Portion:
For Ten Dollars
($10.00) and other good and valuable
consideration, LaRue Fisher and Brent Elmer Fisher, as trustees of
the above-mentioned Trust, hereby transfer, convey, assign and
deliver an undivided sixty percent (60%) interest to Brent Elmer
Fisher, trustee of the Family Trust Portion of the George Fisher,
Jr. Family Trust dated October 10, 1975, and the remaining
undivided forty percent (40%) interest to LaRue Fisher, trustee of
the Marital Trust Portion of the George Fisher, Jr. Family Trust
dated October 10, 1975, as grantees, all right, title, interest,
and obligations pertaining thereto, to the below-described
properties:
1.
50 head of mixed breed
$42,000.00 at date of death of decedent.

beef

cows

valued

at

2.
International Tractor Model 674 valued at $5,500 at
date of death of decedent.

5
All transfers subject to approval in final audit.
Dated this

Jf

day of

/}? «^7

, 1995,

ria.Gl**j^v^^c<iJ?i (JUS
LARUE FISHER, trustee

trustee
STATE OF UTAH
: SS.

COUNTY OF DUCHESNE

)

On this _______
£_ day of ^YV\
/
, 1995, personally
appeared before me LARUE FISHER anc^ BRENT ELMER FISHER, as
trustees, who acknowledged to me that they executed the foregoing
deed Qf«fl,1,1Qfi^tinn nf nrnpjyrty
OMI0LYMEMA06EN
H0*rfiJBUC>6TAl?<1UTM<
DUCHESNE COUNTY
W SOUTH POORwn •«•0UCHESNE.irT8^
C O M M r " x '~

Notary Public

The following death expenses of George Fisher, Jr. shall
be the sole responsibility of the Family Trust Portion of said
Trust and shall be paid from said Family Trust Portion:
0 1 p m Mortuary
Beasley Monument
Cloward Appraisal
Service
Paul J. Barton,
legal fees

$ 5,034.00
1,600.00
3,500.00
797.06
817 31
$11,748.37
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CLOWARD'S APPRAISAL SERVICE
P.O. Box 1264
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
February 22, 1997
Brent Fisher
HC 55 Box 90
Altonah, Utah 84002
RE;

George Fisher Jr. Family Trust
Consisting o£ Four Separate Parcels Land
w/Water Rights, T-l-S, R-4-W, Sec. 13, 24, & 25
and T-l-S, R-3-W, Sec. 17, USB&M.
Fisher Ranch & Cabin, w/Water Rights & Filings,
T-2-N, R-5-W, Sections 34 & 35 USB&M.
Fisher Livestock - 100 Bred Beef Cows

Dear Brent
According to your request, I have herein completed updated values oa the above
described properties belonging to the George Fisher Jr. Family Trust. For fuither detailed
descriptions of these properties, please refer to the original appraisals that were completed
on November 12, 1992 on these parcels as well as on the livestock. In fact, the updated
values contained herein are invalid unless this letter is accompanied by the November 12,
1992, appraisals, I make this stipulation so that any reader of this letter may refer dirccdy
to the full descriptions and all known pertinent facts pertaining to the parcel aid/or parcels
that are herein being appraised.
In order to complete this analysis, 1 have researched and considered various sales of
like land properties in the Altamont area as well as throughout the Uintah B::sm. As you
are aware sales of similar lands with like improvements are scarce, howe cr from my
research, I feel comfortable with the values that I have derived and indicated herein.
These opinions of value are for the surface rights of the lands, building improvements
and all accompanying water rights/filings, no values arc given for the olls/mtr -rals should
there be any. The value estimates are for "market value" as defined on the Cci4 Scatiou and
Statement of limiting Condition pages attached to the November 12, 1992, rppraisals.
With regard to the current value and/or values of the four separate p;*.-cels located
north-northeast of Altamont, I am of the opinion that; Parcel # 1 : T-1«5T R '-W, Scr 2*
Containing 40.0 Acres M/L, Parcel #2: T-l-S. R-4-W. Sec. 24: Containing 40 " Acics M.'L,
and Parcel # 3 : T-l-S. R«4-W. Sec 13: Containing 40,0 Acres M/L, would al! ':ave a value
of $1,200.00 per acre or $48,000.00 per parcel. Parcel #4; T-l-S, R-3-W> Sec. 17 Containing
79.0 Acres M7L, would have a value of $1,000.00 per acre or $79,000.00

„*?jz.\i

can.? ^z ' *eu
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K. Fisher Exh.. 17.

Regarding the value of the Fisher Ranch; T-2-N. R-5-W. Sections 34 & 3S.
Containing 320.70 Acres M^L, newer style ILog Cabin, and Water Rights/Filings; I am of the
opinion this parcel would have a value somewhere is the range of $350,000.00 as a whole;
or could, if sold to the right buyer, or developed into smaller parcels, yield considerably
higher. Nevertheless* the coat of developing and the longevity of selling smaller parcels
would have to be seriously considered. Also, if developing there is the matter of access
across Ute Tribal Lands which would have to be examined for feasibly.
Concerning the value(s) of the livestock; consisting of some 100 mixed breed, bred
cows, ranging in age from five to ten years, I am of the opinion that the HYC to seven year
old cows would be worth somewhere in the range of $650*00. The seven to eight year
$550.00 and the nine to ten year $450.00, with a running average for the herd as a whole
of $550.00 per head. Any cull cows I would suggest be taken to the auction.
Thank you Irindly for this opportunity to be of Service.
Respectfully submitted,
Howard's Appraisal Service

Darren Anderson
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